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SEVENTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL IN NON-
ARTICLE III PROCEEDINGS: A STUDY IN DYSFUNCTIONAL
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY
Martin H. Redish"
Daniel J. La Fave'"
The right to a jury trial in civil cases, as enumerated in the Seventh Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution, is an integral part of the Bill of Rights.
Nevertheless, in this Article, Professor Redish and Mr. La Fave argue that the
Supreme Court has failed to preserve this right when Congress has relegated
claims to a non-Article III forum. Furthermore, they argue, the Court has done so
without providing any basis in constitutional theory to justify such a relinquish-
ment.
Professor Redish and Mr. La Fave first examine the Supreme Court's interpre-
tation of the Seventh Amendment in instances where Congress has remained silent
on the issue of the availability of a jury trial. They proceed to examine the Court's
contrasting response when Congress has explicitly directed that adjudication be
held in a non-Article III forum, without a jury. In an effort to explain the Court's
approach to Seventh Amendment interpretation, they advance several possible
doctrinal models, none of which, in their view, satisfactorily explains the Court's
apparent deference to Congress's decision not to allow a jury trial. They suggest
that the only rational explanation for the Court's current Seventh Amendment juris-
prudence is functionalism: deferring to Congress's determination that some social
or political objective outweighs constitutional considerations. They conclude that
such deference by the Court, as the guardian of the Constitution, is not only un-
principled, but that such a practice actually endangers the supremacy of the Con-
stitution and undermines the judiciary as the countermajoritarian check on the
majoritarian branches of government.
" Louis and Harriet Ancel Professor of Law and Public Policy, Northwestern Uni-
versity School of Law. The authors would like to thank Reid Schar and Howard
Wasserman of the Class of 1997 at Northwestern University School of Law for their
valuable research assistance.
.. B.S., United States Naval Academy, 1985; J.D., Northwestern University School
of Law, 1992. Associate with the firm of Reinhart, Boerner, Van Deuren, Norris &
Rieselbach, S.C., Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
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INTRODUCTION
The Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial in civil cases' is surely as
much a part of the Constitution as the First Amendment right of free
speech2 or the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.3 Yet, per-
haps because the Seventh Amendment has been pedagogically exiled from
traditional constitutional law and instead relegated to the largely sub-consti-
tutional inquiry of civil procedure,4 when the Supreme Court is asked to
enforce the jury trial right, it often seems to abandon any grounding in gov-
erning principles of American constitutional and political theory. To be sure,
the Court has been more than vigorous in its protection of the jury trial right
in the absence of a congressional directive to the contrary.5 When, however,
Congress has clearly enunciated that use of a civil jury is incompatible with
the accomplishment of its legislative goals, the Court has, for the most part,
turned and run faster than a defeated army in retreat.6 Such a judicial atti-
tude is indefensible as a matter of Seventh Amendment construction7 and is
' "In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be
otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of
the common law." U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
2 "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech .... " U.S.
CONST. amend. I.
' "No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself .... U.S. CONST. amend. V.
4 It is worthy of note that every current civil procedure casebook includes discus-
sion of the Seventh Amendment right, while no current constitutional law casebook
does so. Compare RICHARD L. MARCUS ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: A MODERN AP-
PROACH 505-83 (2d ed. 1995) (discussing Seventh Amendment right) and MAURICE
ROSENBERG ET AL., ELEMENTS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 749-80 (5th ed. 1990) (same) with
DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THEMES FOR THE CONSTITUTION'S
THIRD CENTURY (1993) (containing no discussions of Seventh Amendment) and
GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1991) (same).
' See, e.g., Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974); Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531
(1970); Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959). See generally Martin
H. Redish, Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial: A Study in the Irrationality of Ra-
tional Decision Making, 70 Nw. U. L. REV. 486 (1975) (examining various methods for
interpreting the Seventh Amendment, and arguing for a rigid historical interpretation);
discussion infra part I.
6 One possible aberration from this otherwise unwavering deference is
Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989), in which the Court held uncon-
stitutional the absence of a jury trial in an adjudication before a non-Article III bank-
ruptcy judge of an attempt by a trustee in bankruptcy to void an allegedly fraudulent
conveyance. See discussion infra notes 81-88 and accompanying text.
' See discussion infra part III.
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inconsistent with the principles of judicial review embodied in Marbury v.
Madison.' Moreover, it stands in violation of the fundamental precepts of
constitutional democracy, which preclude the majoritarian branches from
sitting in final judgment on the constitutionality of their own actions.9
Nowhere is this abdication of judicial responsibility more starkly appar-
ent than in the Court's treatment of the jury trial right in those instances
where Congress has relegated adjudication of federally-created statutory
claims to a federal forum whose adjudicators lack the protections of salary
and tenure guaranteed by Article III of the Constitution. In such proceed-
ings, which include administrative adjudications and enforcement proceed-
ings as well as actions brought before non-Article III "legislative" courts,
the Supreme Court has all but abandoned the Seventh Amendment right,"
even though there is absolutely no legitimate, principled basis on which to
conclude that a jury trial right is somehow inapplicable to such proceed-
ings. 2
If the Court were simply to make clear that Congress possesses unlimit-
ed authority to avoid the use of juries any time it chooses to place adjudica-
tion in a non-Article III forum, one would at least enjoy the benefits of an
easily understood and applied doctrinal standard. True, it would still be
difficult to comprehend why Congress was thought to possess such unlimit-
ed and unreviewed power despite the existence of an applicable provision of
the countermajoritarian Constitution which seemingly limits that power.
Such a ruling would also leave unclear whether, if Congress does possess
such authority with regard to non-Article III proceedings, it lacks the same
power with regard to proceedings adjudicated in an Article III court, and if
so, why. 3 Nevertheless, at least the advantages of doctrinal ease of appli-
cation would remain. Sadly, however, the Court's jurisprudence denies us
even whatever benefits might be derived from such doctrinal certainty. Pure-
ly as a practical matter, it is clear that when the dust settles, in most cases
Congress possesses ultimate authority to deny the jury trial right by transfer-
ring adjudication to a non-Article III forum. The Court, however, has
8 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); see discussion infra notes 186-92 and accompany-
ing text.
9 For a detailed elaboration of this "countermajoritarian principle," see MARTIN H.
REDISH, THE FEDERAL COURTS IN THE POLITICAL ORDER: JUDICIAL JURISDICTION AND
AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORY 75-85 (1991). See also discussion infra notes 185-92
and accompanying text.
"0 "The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices
during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services a Com-
pensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office." U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 1.
See discussion infra part II.
2 See discussion infra part III.
'3 See discussion infra notesl165-66 and accompanying text.
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achieved this end by resorting to convoluted, unpredictable, and virtually
Byzantine doctrinal contortions that will require, in future cases, a great deal
of judicial time and effort in order to resolve the Seventh Amendment is-
sue. 4 Thus, paradoxically, the Court has managed to give us the worst of
both worlds-the disadvantages of total judicial abdication without any of
its advantages.
Given the often controversial status of the civil jury trial purely as a
matter of current social policy, 5 the right's selective demise at the will of
Congress may seem to represent a relatively minimal undermining of indi-
vidual liberty. It might be argued that such a loss could not compare, for
example, to the loss of the rights of free expression or freedom of religion.
Perhaps if the Court were openly to proclaim the Seventh Amendment's
relative inferiority, and therefore expendability, one could rest more easily in
the belief that the abandonment of fundamental notions of judicial review
embodied in the Court's Seventh Amendment jurisprudence were not likely
to have a dangerous spillover impact on judicial interpretation and enforce-
ment of other constitutional rights. The Court, however, has made no such
proclamation. To the contrary, the Court's staunch belief in the social value
of the Seventh Amendment right remains unwavering-except where Con-
gress has concluded otherwise.6 Thus, no basis exists upon which to dis-
tinguish the Court's Seventh Amendment analysis from its treatment of
other Bill of Rights protections. 7
Our inquiry into the Court's treatment of the Seventh Amendment can
be viewed on two distinct levels. On the most concrete plane, our analysis is
intended to critique and refocus the Supreme Court's Seventh Amendment
jurisprudence. On another level, however, our concern is with the broader,
ominous implications for American constitutional theory to which the
Court's Seventh Amendment analysis arguably gives rise.
"' See discussion infra part II.
's It has been suggested on occasion that use of the civil jury trial adds significant
time-consuming burdens and expenses to the judicial process and that jury decisions are
often plagued by racial or ethnic prejudice. See Redish, supra note 5, at 502-08. Addi-
tionally, critics have questioned the jury's ability as a fact-finder. See, e.g., JEROME
FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 108-45 (1949); LEON GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY 353 (1930)
("As a scientific method of settling disputes the general verdict rates little higher than
the ordeal, compurgation or trial by battle."). This problem is thought by some to be
most intense in so-called complex litigation. See, e.g., In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Anti-
trust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069, 1084 (3d Cir. 1980) (concluding that "due process precludes
trial by jury when a jury is unable to perform this task with a reasonable understanding
of the evidence and the legal rules").
16 See discussion infra part II.
" The only possible explanation for this distinction is the Seventh Amendment's
divergent pedagogical pedigree, see supra note 4, but this is surely an inadequate
ground of distinction for analytical purposes.
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In order to provide a proper baseline for analysis of Congress's power to
ignore jury trial requirements, Part I of this Article describes the Court's
approach to the Seventh Amendment when Congress has remained silent on
the use of juries as part of the adjudicatory process. Part II of this Article
examines how the Court's Seventh Amendment construction has differed
when Congress has directed that adjudication be held in a non-Article III
forum without the use of juries. Part III discusses two approaches to Sev-
enth Amendment interpretation, labeled the "historical/forum" and "condi-
tional waiver" models, that arguably could provide principled justification
for the Court's willingness to retreat in the face of a congressional assault
on the jury trial right. This Article argues, however, that both models are
fatally and unambiguously flawed, and therefore neither even colorably
supports the Court's enormous deference to congressional judgments on the
use of a jury trial. Instead, beneath the Court's cryptic and often confusing
attempts to invoke constitutional principle in support of its deference to
congressional will is the theoretically illegitimate principle of unadorned
functionalism, the third model discussed in our analysis. This mode of con-
stitutional analysis proceeds on the belief that where Congress has conclud-
ed that enforcement of the Seventh Amendment right would be incompatible
with attainment of Congress's legitimate goals, the Seventh Amendment is
somehow rendered irrelevant.
Use of this "functionalist" model in Seventh Amendment interpretation
is troubling as a matter of constitutional theory, because nothing in the text,
structure, or history of the Seventh Amendment provides any basis on which
to permit reliance on such a social balancing process. Even more troubling,
however, is that under the version of functionalism employed in Seventh
Amendment interpretation, it is not the Court but Congress, the very
majoritarian branch sought to be controlled by the countermajoritarian Bill
of Rights, making the final decision on matters of constitutional import. Use
of such an approach constitutes a wholly unprincipled judicial abandonment
of a constitutional right, for no other reason than the Court's deference to
the conclusion of the majoritarian branches that enforcement of that right
would be politically or socially difficult or inconvenient. It is hard to imag-
ine a more stark departure from the constitutional theory of judicial review
that was envisioned so wisely in Marbury v. Madison.18
On very rare occasions the Court has actually overridden a congressional
determination not to employ juries.19 When the Court has departed from
the model of judicial abdication and congressional deference, it has not done
so because of its recognition of the model's complete inconsistency with
governing principles of American constitutional theory. Rather, it has done
8 See discussion infra notes 186-92 and accompanying text.
19 See Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989); discussion infra notes
81-88 and accompanying text.
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so because, aberrationally, it has taken seriously that which was quite proba-
bly never intended to be taken seriously: the veil of principled analysis with
which the "functionalist-abdication" model had been clothed in past deci-
sions. Because the elements of that veil of principle have, in actuality, never
been relevant to legitimate Seventh Amendment interpretation, the Court's
subsequent aberrational reliance on those elements to override the congres-
sional decision not to employ juries turns out to be both awkward and illog-
ical.
In conclusion, Part IV of this Article suggests a fourth analytical model
that we describe as the "strict historical" approach. This model arguably
could justify, in a truly principled manner, many of the Court's modern
decisions authorizing congressional discretion to avoid jury trial. Use of a
strict historical approach, however, has never been accepted by the Court,"
quite probably because the Court is unwilling to accept all of the model's
practical implications about the modern scope of the jury trial right, even in
the absence of congressional restriction on the use of the civil jury.21 As a
result, the Court has failed to take advantage of a coherent method of bring-
ing about, by means of a process that does not threaten core notions of
constitutional democratic theory, its politically desired result of giving Con-
gress broad discretion to abandon the civil jury trial right.
I. ESTABLISHING THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASELINE: SEVENTH AMENDMENT
INTERPRETATION IN THE ABSENCE OF CONGRESSIONAL INTERVENTION
To grasp the full significance of the Supreme Court's approach to con-
gressional efforts to place adjudication in non-Article III forums without the
use of juries, it is first necessary to understand the Supreme Court's Seventh
Amendment interpretation when Congress has not made such a choice. It is
only by seeing how vigorously the Court has expanded and enforced the
civil jury trial right absent congressional interference that one may fully
comprehend how dramatically the Court's enforcement of that right dissi-
pates when Congress does choose to enter the picture. By its terms, the
Seventh Amendment directs that the right to jury trial shall be "preserved"
in "[sluits at common law."2 Use of this wording has lead to a histori-
cally-based interpretive model, one which measures the jury trial right by
reference to the practices of the English courts as of 1791, the year of the
amendment's ratification. 3 Pursuant to this standard, a litigant will have a
constitutional right to jury trial if and only if he would have been afforded a
20 See, e.g., Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 507 (1959) (rejecting
rigid historical approach).
21 See discussion infra part IV.
22 U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
23 See, e.g., Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 476 (1935).
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jury trial had the same litigation arisen in 1791.24 That issue was, in turn,
resolved by asking whether the case would have been heard at law, with the
opportunity for a jury trial, or in equity, where no jury was used.25
According to the generally accepted historical view," the distinction
between law and equity was, in the overwhelming majority of cases, deter-
mined not by an assessment of the relative fact-finding capabilities of judge
and jury,27 but rather simply by the allocation of jurisdiction between
courts of law and equity.28 In most, though by no means all, cases, the le-
gal-equitable division was made on the basis of the remedy sought: where
damages were sought, the suit was at law; where injunctive relief or specific
performance was sought, the suit was equitable.29 Established procedure
24 See Pemell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 374-75 (1974).
25 Id. at 375. See generally Charles Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Sev-
enth Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REV. 639 (1973) (examining the history surrounding the
adoption of the Seventh Amendment in order to determine the original understanding of
the amendment).
26 In more modem times, it has been argued that historically, the abilities of juries
actually influenced the allocation between law and equity. See Patrick Devlin, Jury
Trial of Complex Cases: English Practice at the Time of the Seventh Amendment, 80
COLUM. L. REV. 43, 65-77 (1980). But cf. Richard 0. Lempert, Civil Juries and Com-
plex Cases: Let's Not Rush to Judgment, 80 MICH. L. REV. 68, 74 (1981) ("As I read
the evidence, it appears that the historical test gives little comfort to those who wish to
read a complexity exception into the [S]eventh [A]mendment.").
In Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1973), the Court indicated in dictum that the
"legal" nature of an issue is determined in part by "the practical abilities and limitations
of juries." Id. at 538 n.10. In subsequent decisions, however, the Court failed to make
reference to this factor. See, e.g., Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers Local No. 391 v.
Terry, 494 U.S. 558 (1990); Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412 (1987). In
Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989), the Court suggested that the
reference in the Ross footnote was intended to refer to the "quite distinct inquiry into
whether Congress has permissibly entrusted the resolution of certain disputes to an ad-
ministrative agency or specialized court of equity, and whether jury trials would impair
the'functioning of the legislative scheme." Id. at 42 n.4.
21 See, e.g., Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959). The one clear-
ly established exception concerned an accounting, where the complexity of the task
could transform a case from legal to equitable. See Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369
U.S. 469, 478 (1962) ("[T]he plaintiff must be able to show that the 'accounts between
the parties' are of such a 'complicated nature' that only a court of equity can satisfac-
torily unravel them.") (citation omitted).
28 See FLEMING JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE 344 (1965) ("At no time in history was
the line dividing equity from law altogether-or even largely-the product of a rational
choice between issues which were better suited to court or to jury trial.... Rather, the
choice between law and equity frequently was made upon consideration of other fac-
tors.").
29 See CHARLES A. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERXL COuRTS 654-61 (5th ed. 1994); see
also Beacon Theatres, 359 U.S. at 506-11 (discussing the effect of the Declaratory
Judgment Act and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on equitable and legal issues, and
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also dictated that equity would act only when the remedy at law was inade-
quate.30
The task of translating historical practice into the modem procedural
context has not proven to be easy. This is due to the fact that where law and
equity have merged, new remedies and procedural devices have been creat-
ed, and new substantive causes of action have been established.31 Yet, giv-
en the historical directive clearly embodied in the Seventh Amendment's
text, the Court would appear to have no principled alternative in its interpre-
tation of the jury trial right.32
To avoid the modem anomalies that might result from an attempt to
provide a rigid reproduction of history, the Court has attempted to view the
historical dividing line between law and equity from the perspective of mod-
em conditions. Thus, although the Court has proclaimed adherence to the
established precept that equity will act only when the remedy at law is inad-
equate, it has chosen to measure the adequacy of "legal" remedies by refer-
ence to modern conditions, rather than to the circumstances of 1791."
While such an approach is not free from controversy,34 and on occasion
has arguably been applied in a questionable manner,35 at least in the ab-
stract it represents a principled interpretation of the amendment's text. By its
use of the term "preserved," the amendment directs that the jury trial right
be measured in terms of its existence in 1791, and at that time a case would
be heard in equity, without a jury, only when the remedies at law were
inadequate. The amendment does not explicitly provide, however, that ade-
quacy of the legal remedy today be determined by the practices of the past.
Instead, one could reasonably construe the amendment's historical directive
to require that the law-equity distinction today be drawn, as it was in 1791,
on the basis of the adequacy of the legal remedy, but drawing that distinc-
tion by analyzing the adequacy of the legal remedy as it exists today, rather
the corresponding relationship to a jury trial right).
30 See, e.g., Beacon Theatres, 359 U.S. at 506-07.
"' See, e.g., Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 539-43 (1970) (holding that post-
amendment merger of law and equity renders shareholder's derivative action legal, even
though it was equitable in 1791); Dairy Queen, 369 U.S. at 478 (noting that the avail-
ability of appointment of special masters to assist a jury renders jury trial adequate to
conduct complex accounting); Beacon Theatres, 359 U.S. at 508-11 (discussing the
expansion of adequate legal remedies available due to the existence of the Declaratory
Judgment Act and the Federal Rules, and the corresponding effect on equity).
32 See Redish, supra note 5, at 490-502.
3 See cases cited supra note 31.
3 See Redish, supra note 5, at 490-502 (suggesting that such an approach unduly
expands reach of jury trial right).
3 Most subject to criticism has been the decision in Ross, where the Court appeared
to rewrite the nature of the derivative action at common law. See Ross, 396 U.S. at 545
(Stewart, J., dissenting) ("The Court begins by assuming the 'dual nature' of the
shareholder's action .... This conceptualization is without any historical basis.").
414 [Vol. 4:2
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than in 1791. Indeed, it might be argued that the Court's "modernizing"
approach is wholly consistent with the well-accepted model of modem con-
stitutional interpretation, which views the document as a living, growing
entity."
The Court has similarly held that the Seventh Amendment's historical
directive does not require photographic reproduction of historical procedures
when those procedures are found to be "collateral" to the jury trial right.37
Thus, new procedural limitations on the use of juries may be developed, as
long as they do not interfere with the performance of that which was the
jury's essential function at the time of the amendment's adoption.38 Finally,
although the amendment dictates only that the jury trial right be "pre-
served," the fact that a particular cause of action did not exist in 1791 does
not necessarily free it from the Seventh Amendment's mandate. Instead, at
least since the time of Justice Story's opinion in Parsons v. Bedford,39 the
Court has asked whether, if the newly created cause of action had existed at
the time of the amendment's ratification, the suit would have been deemed
one in law or equity.' If, either through discovery of a substantive ana-
logue or by reference to the nature of the remedy sought,4 ' the Court deter-
mines that the suit would have been adjudicated in the law courts in 1791,
suits under that cause of action are deemed to be controlled by the jury trial
right.42
36 See John C. McCoid, II, Procedural Reform and the Right to Jury Trial: A Study
of Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 11 (1967) (suggesting that
this approach "fits well with the conception of the Constitution as a durable document
providing continuingly useful standards for an evolving society").
" Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 390-92 (1943).
31 See, e.g., id. at 388-96 (holding directed verdict constitutional, even though it did
not exist in its current form in 1791).
19 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433 (1830).
By common law [the framers of the Seventh Amendment] meant... not merely
suits, which the common law recognized among its old and settled proceedings,
but suits in which legal rights were to be ascertained and determined, in contra-
distinction to those where equitable rights alone were recognized, and equitable
remedies were administered.... In a just sense, the amendment may well be
construed to embrace all suits which are not of equity and admiralty jurisdiction,
whatever may be the peculiar form which they may assume to settle legal rights.
Id. at 447.
o See, e.g., Pemell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 375-76 (1974).
4' These are the two factors currently considered by the Court in deciding whether a
modem suit is to be deemed legal or equitable. Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers Local
No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 565 (1990); Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417-
18 (1987). The latter factor is said to be given more weight than the former. Terry, 494
U.S. at 565.
42 See cases cited supra note 31; see also Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 195-96
(1974) ("[T]his cause of action is analogous to a number of tort actions recognized at
1995]
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In fashioning its approach, the Court has expressly declared its unwill-
ingness to counterbalance the amendment's jury trial directive with
subconstitutional social policy harms to which the use of jury trial might
give rise in a particular situation.43 Such a refusal appears constitutionally
proper in light of the absence of any reference to such concerns in either the
text or structure of the amendment. A superficially appealing argument
might be fashioned that such factors could properly be considered, consis-
tent with the terms of the amendment, because historically equity acted
when the remedy at law was inadequate. Thus, when strong countervailing
social policies against the use of the civil jury exist, the remedy at law
might today be deemed inadequate for the very reason that a suit at law
would require use of a jury. As already noted, however, with the one excep-
tion of an accounting, little or no historical basis exists to support the posi-
tion that at the time of the amendment's ratification, adequacy of legal rem-
edy in any way turned on the social costs or harms of juries." According-
ly, reliance on the adequacy-of-remedy analysis to support the imposition of
modem limitations on the jury trial right would constitute nothing more than
a cynically-developed veneer for the unprincipled undermining of a constitu-
tional right, in a manner not contemplated by either the text or structure of
that right.
The preceding discussion has described Seventh Amendment jurispru-
dence as it has been developed in a context of congressional neutrality on
the appropriateness of jury use. In fact, commentators have emphasized this
point, suggesting that the amendment's reach might be curtailed in the event
Congress expressed a clear choice against the use of jury trial.45 The accu-
racy of this conclusion remains uncertain. The following analysis demon-
strates, however, that if accepted, such a conclusion would represent a dra-
matic departure from fundamental principles of American constitutional
theory.
common law. More important, the relief sought here-actual and punitive damages-is
the traditional form of relief offered in the courts of law.").
" See Curtis, 415 U.S. at 198 ("We are not oblivious to the force of petitioner's
policy arguments [against the use of jury trial].... More fundamentally, however, these
considerations are insufficient to overcome the clear command of the Seventh Amend-
ment.").
' See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
45 See, e.g., JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE (2d ed. 1993).
[T]he Supreme Court has not yet been faced with the situation in which Congress
has expressed a strong preference for nonjury trial and has provided reasons sup-
porting that preference. Read more narrowly, then, the cases do not foreclose the
possibility that Congress can provide for a statutory cause of action that is not
purely equitable to be enforced in the district courts without a jury trial.
Id. at 504.
416 [Vol. 4:2
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II. SEVENTH AMENDMENT INTERPRETATION IN THE FACE OF
CONGRESSIONAL TRANSFER OF ADJUDICATION TO A NON-ARTICLE III
FORUM
In those instances where Congress has transferred adjudication of a fed-
eral claim to a non-Article III forum, such as an administrative agency, the
Court has changed dramatically its Seventh Amendment analysis from its
description in the preceding section. As early as 1921, in its decision in
Block v. Hirsh," the Court made clear its willingness to view such situa-
tions differently for Seventh Amendment purposes. In Block, the Court up-
held Congress's power to temporarily suspend District of Columbia
landlords' legal remedy of ejectment and to relegate them to fact-finding in
an administrative forum, without a jury.47 In response to a Seventh
Amendment challenge, the Court stated: "If the power of the Commission
established by the statute to regulate the relation [between landlord and
tenant] is established, as we think it is, by what we have said, this objection
amounts to little. To regulate the relation and to decide the facts affecting it
are hardly separable."" Nevertheless, while the Court had, in fact, already
upheld Congress's power to establish the commission apart from Seventh
Amendment considerations,49 such a conclusion is wholly unresponsive to
the Seventh Amendment concern. The Court simply appeared to assume that
if the commission were constitutionally valid in all other ways, no Seventh
Amendment right could conceivably attach itself to such administrative
proceedings.
The Court first made a serious attempt to rationalize the inapplicability
of the Seventh Amendment right to non-Article III proceedings in NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.50 In the National Labor Relations Act,51
Congress invested the National Labor Relations Board with authority to
decide whether an employer had committed an unfair labor practice under
the statute and to order reinstatement and backpay where appropriate. 52 In
response to a Seventh Amendment attack, the Court had two answers. Ini-
tially, it reasoned that "[t]he instant case is not a suit at common law or in
the nature of such a suit. The proceeding is one unknown to the common
law. It is a statutory proceeding. 53 Secondly, the Court responded that the
only arguably "legal" relief for which a jury trial could be required under
256 U.S. 135 (1921).
4' Id. at 153-58.
4 Id. at 158.
49 Id. at 154-58.
5o 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
5, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988).
52 Id. § 160(c).
51 Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 48.
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the Seventh Amendment was the award of backpay, and such relief was
merely incidental to the primary relief of reinstatement, which was equita-
ble. 4 Therefore, under the historically well-established "clean-up doctrine,"
the equitable forum could adjudicate such incidental legal issues without
contravening the Seventh Amendment.55
Both of the Court's proffered reasons at least superficially adhere to the
principled dictates of the Seventh Amendment, and thus would not appear to
fall under the heading of a "functionalist abdication" model. In reality, how-
ever, the Court's first reason is wholly inconsistent with both Seventh
Amendment text and relevant Supreme Court doctrine. By its terms, the
amendment applies to "[s]uits at common law." Surely, it would defy lin-
guistic reality to characterize the proceeding before the National Labor Rela-
tions Board as something other than a "suit." The action concerns nothing
more than a classic legal dispute between private parties asserting competing
factual claims and legal rights. It therefore fits well within the scope of
Article III's so-called "case or controversy" requirement for adjudication in
a federal court. 6 While the Court was correct of course in its assertion that
the particular proceeding did not exist at common law, the amendment
makes no reference to "proceedings"; rather, it refers merely to "suits."
To be sure, if not only a particular proceeding but also the underlying
substantive right itself did not exist in 1791, that fact could conceivably pro-
vide a principled textual basis for removing the suit from the strictures of
the Seventh Amendment. Ever since its decision in Parsons v. Bedford,57
however, the Court had long rejected such reasoning. 8 Instead, for newly
created substantive rights, the Court has always asked whether, if the right
had existed at common law, there would have been a jury trial. 9 If the an-
swer is yes, the Seventh Amendment right is deemed to be as applicable as
if the cause of action had actually existed in 1791.' The Court made no
suggestion in Jones & Laughlin that it in any way intended to abandon the
teachings of Parsons, nor has the Court done so since that time.6 Thus, to
54 Id.
" Under the "clean-up" doctrine, a court in equity could dispose of legal questions,
as long as they were incidental to the equitable claim. See A. Leo Levin, Equitable
Clean-up and the Jury: A Suggested Orientation, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 320 (1951); see,
e.g., Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 48-49.
56 U.S. CONST. art. III., § 2.
5' See supra note 39.
5 Parsons was expressly reaffirmed in Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 193-94
(1974), and Pemell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 374-75 (1974).
" See, e.g., Pernell, 416 U.S. at 375-76 (finding statutory right to recover possession
of real property essentially equivalent to an ejectment action, which historically was
resolved by jury).
6 See, e.g., id.
61 See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 45, at 500-06.
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the extent that the Court in Jones & Laughlin was implicitly exempting
newly created causes of action from the confines of the Seventh Amend-
ment, it was apparently doing so only when Congress had chosen to rely
upon the expertise and efficiency of administrative fact-finding, with which
a jury trial would be incompatible as a functional matter. Indeed, the mod-
em day Supreme Court has expressly distinguished Jones & Laughlin from
traditional suits in Article III courts solely on this "functional incompatibili-
ty" ground.6"
In Jones & Laughlin the Court quite probably could have avoided the
need to adopt its apparent selective abandonment of the Parsons directive,
had it chosen to rely exclusively on its second basis for rejecting the jury
trial right. No one could seriously doubt that the requested relief of rein-
statement sought in Jones & Laughlin was properly characterized as equita-
ble, to which no jury trial right historically attached. Nor was it unreason-
able for the Court to conclude that, in the case before it, reinstatement con-
stituted the primary relief requested. Hence, pursuant to the venerable
"clean-up" doctrine, an equity court would have been authorized, at the time
of the Seventh Amendment's adoption, to provide legal relief incidental to
the primary equitable relief.63 At least in the case before it, then, the Court
in Jones & Laughlin need not have selectively manipulated the rule of Par-
sons v. Bedford in order to uphold the NLRB proceeding against a Seventh
Amendment challenge. The Court in Jones & Laughlin, however, appears to
have considered the practical stakes to be much higher than merely the
result in the immediate case before it. At stake, arguably, was the fate of
much of the New Deal, for if the Seventh Amendment right to jury trial
were to attach to a large portion of the adjudications vested in the adminis-
trative process, one of the New Deal's primary goals-efficient rule by an
expert cadre of bureaucrats 64 -would have been rendered considerably
more difficult to attain.
Overt recognition of such a pragmatic rationale for the inapplicability of
the jury trial right in administrative proceedings actually came many years
later in Curtis v. Loether." In Curtis, the Supreme Court steadfastly re-
fused to balance the Seventh Amendment right against competing social
policy considerations in an Article III court proceeding brought to enforce a
federal statutory right.66 In response to the argument that Jones & Laughlin
62 See Curtis, 415 U.S. at 194 ("Jones & Laughlin merely stands for the proposition
that the Seventh Amendment is generally inapplicable in administrative proceedings,
where jury trials would be incompatible with the whole concept of administrative adju-
dication and would substantially interfere with the NLRB's role in the statutory
scheme.") (footnote omitted).
63 See generally Levin, supra note 55.
6 See generally JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938).
65 415 U.S. 189 (1974).
6 See id. at 198. At issue in Curtis was whether the Civil Rights Act or the Seventh
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supported such a pragmatic weighing process, the Court in Curtis distin-
guished Jones & Laughlin as a case in which use of a jury trial would be
"incompatible" with the congressionally-created administrative schemeY
The Court thus puzzlingly combined in the same opinion a rigidly principled
refusal to balance a constitutional right with an open admission that interfer-
ence with a congressional legislative scheme would justify abandonment of
that right.
Three years after Curtis, in Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety &
Health Review Commission," the Court removed any conceivable doubt
about the scope of Congress's power to place adjudication of federal statuto-
ry claims in a non-Article III tribunal, free from the strictures of the Seventh
Amendment. In Atlas Roofing, the Court considered a Seventh Amendment
challenge to the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970.69 That Act
authorized federal administrators to inspect private workplaces and to im-
pose civil penalties for violations of federally established health and safety
standards for workers. 0 The proceeding was to be brought initially before
an administrative law judge of the Occupational Safety and Health Review
Commission.7' Under the Act, "[tihe findings of the Commission with re-
spect to questions of fact, if supported by substantial evidence on the record
considered as a whole, shall be conclusive."72 The Court, in an opinion by
Justice White, found the Act constitutional:
At least in cases in which "public rights" are being liti-
gated-e.g., cases in which the Government sues in its sov-
ereign capacity to enforce public rights created by statutes
within the power of Congress to enact-the Seventh Amend-
ment does not prohibit Congress from assigning the fact-
finding function and initial adjudication to an administrative
forum with which the jury would be incompatible.73
While the Court's reference in Atlas Roofing to the so-called "public rights"
doctrine arguably limits the extent of its deference to congressional will, its
Amendment required a jury trial on demand of either party, in an action for damages
and injunctive relief under § 812 of the Act, which allowed private plaintiffs to bring
suit for violations of the fair housing provision of the Act, Title VII. Id. at 189-90; see
also supra note 43.
67 See Curtis, 415 U.S. at 194; supra note 62.
68 430 U.S. 442 (1977).
- 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1970).
70 Id.
" Id. § 661(i) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 6610) (1988)).
72 Id. § 660(a).
" Atlas Roofing, 430 U.S. at 450.
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reliance on that concept in Seventh Amendment interpretation is puzzling.
Nothing in the history of common law practice in any way distinguished
between law and equity on the basis of the "public" or "private" nature of
the right being adjudicated.7 4 Rather, as established doctrine makes clear,
that distinction turned largely on the nature of the relief sought.75 In con-
trast, the public rights concept evolved in a jurisprudential universe quite
distinct from that of the Seventh Amendment: determination of the scope of
Congress's authority to place adjudication of federal claims in non-Article
III forums.76 Since its decisions in Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land &
Improvement Co.77 and Crowell v. Benson,78 the Court has recognized that
Congress may transfer adjudication of "public" but not "private" rights to
such forums, despite Article III's seemingly unlimited dictate that "the judi-
cial power shall be vested" in courts whose judges possess protection of
their salary and tenure.79 The Court has adhered to the public-private right
dichotomy in fashioning the scope of congressional power to vest adjudica-
tory authority in non-Article III federal forums, even though it has never
clearly explained either the exact nature of the conceptual distinction be-
" See Mark I. Greenberg, The Right to Jury Trial in Non-Article III Courts and
Administrative Agencies after Granfinanciera v. Nordberg, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 479,
492 ("No precedent cited by the [Atlas Roofing] Court... held explicitly that the Sev-
enth Amendment did not apply to cases involving public rights.").
71 See discussion supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text.
76 See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., 'Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agen-
cies, and Article III, 101 HARV. L. REV. 915 (1988) (arguing that although initial adju-
dications may be made by non-Article III courts, appellate review of those adjudications
should be by Article III courts); Martin H. Redish, Legislative Courts, Administrative
Agencies and the Northern Pipeline Decision, 1983 DUKE L.J. 197 (discussing alterna-
tive rationales for allocating judicial authority between Article III and non-Article III
courts).
7' 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1855).
[T]here are matters, involving public rights, which may be presented in such form
that the judicial power is capable of acting on them, and which are susceptible of
judicial determination, but which congress may or may not bring within the cogni-
zance of the courts of the United States, as it may deem proper.
Id. at 284. But cf. MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLO-
CATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 66 (2d ed. 1990) (noting that the Court in Murray's Lessee
"made no reference to the language, history or policies of Article III to support [the]
suggested dichotomy").
78 285 U.S. 22, 50 (1932) ("As to determinations of fact, the distinction is at once
apparent between cases of private right and those which arise between the Government
and persons subject to its authority in connection with the performance of the constitu-
tional functions of the executive or legislative departments.").
79 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; see, e.g., Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co.,
473 U.S. 568, 582-93 (1985); Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,
458 U.S. 50, 57-87 (1982); see discussion infra part III.A.1.
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tween the two forms of rights or the rationale for drawing the distinction in
the first place."0
Despite its total lack of prior grounding in Seventh Amendment jurispru-
dence, the Court's sudden insertion of the public rights doctrine into analy-
sis of the jury trial right went largely unexplained in Justice White's opinion
in Atlas Roofing. Nevertheless, the Court drew on the public rights dichoto-
my in fashioning the scope of the Seventh Amendment right in its subse-
quent decision in Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg.1 In that case the Court
held unconstitutional the absence of a defendant's jury trial right in an ac-
tion brought by a trustee in bankruptcy to void an allegedly fraudulent con-
veyance. 2 The Court so held, even though Congress had designated such
actions to be "core proceedings," to be adjudicated in the first instance by
non-Article III bankruptcy courts. 3 The majority in Granfinanciera reached
its conclusion while purporting to adhere to. the teachings of Atlas Roof-
ing. 4 "Congress may devise novel causes of action involving public rights
free from the strictures of the Seventh Amendment," Justice Brennan wrote,
"if it assigns their adjudication to tribunals without statutory authority to
employ juries as factfinders."85 He added, however, that Congress
80 See REDISH, supra note 77, at 64-71. In its original context of Article III interpre-
tation, "[t]he public-private right dichotomy effectively frustrates the purposes served by
the constitutional protections of judicial independence." Id. at 68.
81 492 U.S. 33 (1989). For a perceptive discussion of Granfinanciera, see G. Ray
Warner, Rotten to the "Core": An Essay on Juries, Jurisdiction and Granfinanciera, 59
UMKC L. REV. 991 (1991).
82 Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 40-49.
See Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 50 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(H) (1988)). In
1978, Congress had established a system of non-Article III bankruptcy courts to replace
the previously existing "referee" system. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 53. While Con-
gress designated these courts to be "adjuncts" to the federal district courts, the Supreme
Court in Northern Pipeline found the bankruptcy courts to be too independent of the
district courts to fit within the "adjunct" concept. Id. at 76-87. The Court further held
that like non-Article III courts, the bankruptcy courts could not constitutionally adju-
dicate state-created rights involving the trustee in bankruptcy, because the only federal
judicial bodies with power to hear such "private right" claims were Article III federal
courts. Id. at 67-72. See generally infra note 130 (discussing Congress's response to the
ruling in Northern Pipeline).
84 Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 51-55.
85 Id. at 51. Notice should be made of Justice Brennan's qualification that the as-
signment is to "tribunals without statutory authority to employ juries as factfinders." Id.
His implication seems to be that Congress may not remove the jury trial right even
from a non-Article III forum, unless it has statutorily rendered that forum incapable of
using juries, even when adjudication of a public right is involved. This qualification
might explain the Court's earlier invocation of the Seventh Amendment right in Pemell
v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363 (1974), even though the proceeding in question was in
the local District of Columbia courts, which do not have Article III status. Palmore v.
United States, 411 U.S. 389, 407-10 (1973). While the Court in Pernell acknowledged
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lacks the power to strip parties contesting matters of private
right of their constitutional right to a trial by jury. . . . [T]o
hold otherwise would be to permit Congress to eviscerate the
Seventh Amendment's guarantee by assigning to administra-
tive agencies or courts of equity all causes of action not
grounded in state law ......
Justice Brennan distinguished Atlas Roofing on the grounds that adjudi-
cation of a public right was not involved in Granfinanciera.87 To reach that
conclusion, however, it was necessary for him to explain exactly why a
bankruptcy trustee's right to void a fraudulent conveyance did not fall with-
in the definition of "public right," a concept that had mysteriously remained
undefined in Atlas Roofing.88 Such a task would present little difficulty
under the definition originally adopted in Justice Brennan's plurality opinion
in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,89 where
the Court held that it was a violation of Article III to use non-Article III
bankruptcy courts to adjudicate state-created claims involving a bankrupt.'
In Northern Pipeline, Justice Brennan had reasoned that except in the case
of certain narrow, historically-based exceptions,9 Congress could, consis-
tent with Article III, vest federal adjudicatory power in non-Article III bod-
ies only for claims of "public right."92 He confined that concept "only to
the existence of the line of cases recognizing the absence of the jury trial right in ad-
ministrative proceedings, the Court nevertheless stated:
We may assume that the Seventh Amendment would not be a bar to a congressio-
nal effort to entrust landlord-tenant disputes ... to an administrative agency.
Congress has not seen fit to do so, however, but rather has provided that ac-
tions.., be brought as ordinary civil actions in the District of Columbia's court
of general jurisdiction. Where it has done so, and where the action involves rights
and remedies recognized at common law, it must preserve to parties their right to
a jury trial.
Pernell, 416 U.S. at 383.
If, however, Congress were by statute to establish a non-Article III court for the
District of Columbia to adjudicate all public fights without the use of jury trial, it would
seem that, by the Court's logic, the Seventh Amendment would not provide a bar. Thus,
in neither Pernell nor Granfinanciera does the Court appear to be drawing a distinction,
for Seventh Amendment purposes, between non-Article III administrative proceedings
and non-Article III legislative courts. See discussion infra part III.A.1.
86 Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 51-52.
87 Id. at 55.
88 See discussion supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
89 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
90 Id. at 83-87.
9' These exceptions included both territorial and military courts. See id. at 64-66.
92 Id. at 67.
1995]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
matters arising 'between the Government and persons subject to its authority
in connection with the performance of the constitutional functions of the
executive or legislative departments."' 93
Under this definition, a fraudulent conveyance action brought by a trust-
ee in bankruptcy against a private entity or individual clearly could not be
thought to involve adjudication of a public right. After Northern Pipeline,
however, the Court in Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products
Co.94 significantly altered the definition of "public right" for purposes of
Congress's power to transfer adjudication to a non-Article III forum: "Con-
gress, acting for a valid legislative purpose pursuant to its constitutional
powers under Article I, may create a seemingly 'private' right that is so
closely integrated into a public regulatory scheme as to be a matter appro-
priate for agency resolution with limited involvement by the Article III
judiciary."'95 Justice O'Connor, speaking for the Court, reasoned that "[t]o
hold otherwise would be to erect a rigid and formalistic restraint on the
ability of Congress to adopt innovative measures such as negotiation and
arbitration with respect to rights created by a regulatory scheme."96 In a
separate concurring opinion, Justice Brennan, author of the Northern Pipe-
line plurality opinion, ignored his own prior unambiguous assertions to the
contrary in Northern Pipeline,97 and asserted:
the plurality opinion in Northern Pipeline [does not] sug-
gest[] ... that "the right to an Article III forum is absolute
unless the federal government is a party of record" ....
Properly understood, the analysis elaborated by the plurality
in Northern Pipeline does not place the Federal Government
in an Art. III straightjacket whenever a dispute technically is
one between private parties.9
The Court appeared to go even further a year later in Commodity Fu-
tures Trading Commission v. Schor.99 In that case, the Court upheld
Congress's power to vest in the non-Article III Futures Trading Commission
the authority to adjudicate state-created counterclaims for breach of contract
brought by a broker who had been sued by a client for federal law viola-
" Id. at 67-68 (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50 (1932)).
94 473 U.S. 568 (1985).
9' Id. at 593-94.
96 Id. at 594.
9' See discussion supra note 93 and accompanying text.
98 Thomas, 473 U.S. at 598-99 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting the majority opin-
ion, id. at 586).
99 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
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tions.'" Justice O'Connor, once again writing for the Court, stated that
"there is no reason inherent in separation of powers principles to accord the
state law character of a claim talismanic power in Article III inquiries."''
Citing the Court's earlier explanation, she noted:
"[T]he public rights doctrine reflects simply a pragmatic un-
derstanding that when Congress selects a quasi-judicial meth-
od of resolving matters that 'could be conclusively deter-
mined by the Executive and Legislative Branches,' the dan-
ger of encroaching on the judicial powers" is less than when
private rights, which are normally within the purview of the
judiciary, are relegated as an initial matter to administrative
adjudication. 12
Accordingly, "the congressional authorization of limited CFTC jurisdiction
over a narrow class of common law claims as an incident to the CFTC's
primary, and unchallenged, adjudicative function does not create a substan-
tial threat to the separation of powers.' ' 3
A strong argument could be fashioned that the trustee's right to void a
fraudulent conveyance made by the bankrupt, the very claim involved in
Granfinanciera, meets the revised standards adopted in Thomas and Schor
for definition of a "public right." If so, in light of the Court's earlier holding
in Atlas Roofing that Congress need not extend the jury trial right to an
adjudication of a "public right" in a non-Article III proceeding,"
Congress's failure to employ a jury in the adjudication of such a claim in
the non-Article III bankruptcy courts should not be deemed a -violation of
the Seventh Amendment. The goal of the bankruptcy system is to free the
bankrupt from the shackles of past debt while simultaneously protecting the
interests of the bankrupt's creditors by making them whole to the greatest
extent possible. 5 Obviously, the smaller the size of the bankrupt's estate,
the less that each creditor will receive. Thus, a trustee's right to void a
fraudulent conveyance performs the central functions of assuring the largest
estate possible and effectuating a division of that estate among creditors in
'0o Id. at 857.
101 Id. at 853.
102 Id. at 853-54 (quoting Thomas, 473 U.S. at 589 (quoting Northern Pipeline, 458
U.S. at 68)).
"03 Id. at 854. Justice Brennan dissented, arguing: "the Court, in emphasizing that this
litigation will permit solely a narrow class of state-law claims to be decided by a non-
Article III court, ignores the fact that it establishes a broad principle." Id. at 865
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
04 See discussion supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text.
105 PETER A. ALCES & MARGARET HOWARD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON BANKRUPT-
CY 11 (1995).
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accordance with the priorities adopted by Congress."° Under this analysis,
the fraudulent conveyance action would easily fit under the Court's defini-
tion in Thomas of "public right" as "a seemingly 'private' right that is...
closely integrated into a public regulatory scheme.""0 7
Without even acknowledging the strong central connection between the
"seemingly 'private' right" involved in the fraudulent conveyance action and
the "public regulatory scheme" of bankruptcy, Justice Brennan's opinion in
Granfinanciera concluded that "[a]lthough the issue admits of some debate,
a bankruptcy trustee's right to recover a fraudulent conveyance ... seems to
us more accurately characterized as a private rather than a public right as we
have used those terms in our Article III decisions." ' Justice Brennan sup-
ported his conclusion by reasoning that such actions "are quintessentially
suits at common law that more nearly resemble state-law contract claims
brought by a bankrupt corporation to augment the bankruptcy estate than
they do creditors' hierarchically ordered claims to a pro rata share of the
bankruptcy res.""°
Upon superficial examination, Granfinanciera may appear to impose
meaningful limits on Congress's power to circumvent the Seventh Amend-
ment right to jury trial: where adjudication of "private," rather than "public"
rights is involved, Congress may not deprive a litigant of a jury trial when
such a right would have existed at common law, even when adjudication
occurs in a non-Article III federal forum.10 Even if it were true that
Granfinanciera imposes such limitations, however, questions would remain
as to why the existence of the Seventh Amendment right in any way turned
on the public or private nature of the right being adjudicated. Certainly, no
such connection existed at common law in 1791, the temporal point of Sev-
enth Amendment reference."' Moreover, an additional, unresolved ques-
tion remains regarding whether Congress could circumvent the Seventh
Amendment right when adjudication of a "public right" was placed in an
Article III court, rather than in a non-Article III forum. 2 Neither Atlas
Roofing nor Granfinanciera directly considered this issue. It is, however, by
no means clear, on the basis of Granfinanciera, that ultimately Congress is
truly restricted in its power to remove a jury trial from a non-Article III
proceeding, even in the case of a private right adjudication.
In Granfinanciera, Justice Brennan could hardly deny that much in Atlas
Roofing at least implied total judicial deference to a congressional judgment
'06 See 11 U.S.C. § 507 (1994).
107 Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 594 (1985).
08 Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 55 (1988).
109 Id. at 56.
1 ld. at 54-55.
... See discussion supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
"2 See discussion infra notes 165-66 and accompanying text.
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concerning the incompatibility of the use of civil jury trial with a statutory
scheme.1"3 One might reasonably have expected Justice Brennan to distin-
guish Atlas Roofing on the grounds that Atlas Roofing's deferential analysis
logically applied only to the adjudication of public rights, something Justice
Brennan had already concluded was not the subject of litigation in
Granfinanciera. After all, he had expended considerable effort in his expli-
cations of both the intersection between the Seventh Amendment and the
public rights doctrine on the one hand, and the definition of a "public right"
on the other. "4 Nevertheless, he did not distinguish Atlas Roofing. Instead,
Justice Brennan responded in the following manner:
To be sure, we owe some deference to Congress' [sic]
judgment after it has given careful consideration to the con-
stitutionality of a legislative provision. But respondent has
adduced no evidence that Congress considered the constitu-
tional implications of its designation of all fraudulent con-
veyance actions as core proceedings. Nor can it seriously be
argued that permitting jury trials in fraudulent conveyance
actions brought by a trustee against a person who has not
entered a claim against the estate would "go far to dismantle
the statutory scheme," as we used that phrase in Atlas Roof-
ing [which] plainly assumed that such claims carried with
them a right to a jury trial. In addition, one cannot easily
say that "the jury would be incompatible" with bankruptcy
proceedings .... "5
Although this passage does not formally commit the Court to this position,
Justice Brennan's words create a reasonable inference that had Congress
made careful consideration of the Seventh Amendment right before directing
that jury trials not be used in the adjudication of fraudulent conveyance
actions, or had the Court been convinced that jury trials were, in fact, "in-
compatible" with the legislative scheme, Congress's decision to abandon the
jury trial right would 'have been constitutionally acceptable. After all, if
nothing were intended to turn on the presence or absence of these factors,
why would Justice Brennan have given them attention in the first place?
113 Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S.
442, 450 (1977); see discussion supra note 73 and accompanying text; infra note 115
and accompanying text. In this context, it is worth noting that Justice White's opinion
in Atlas Roofing started out by stating "[alt least in cases in which 'public rights' are
being litigated." Atlas Roofing, 430 U.S. at 450 (emphasis added). He thus left open the
question of Congress's power in the absence of a public right.
114 Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 51-55.
115 Id. at 61-62 (quoting Atlas Roofing, 430 U.S. at 454 n.ll; id. at 450).
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Tending to undermine this reading of the Granfinanciera opinion, and
arguably confusing the issues completely, is Justice Brennan's subsequent
assertion that although possibly "providing jury trials in some fraudulent
conveyance actions.., would impede swift resolution of bankruptcy pro-
ceedings and increase the expense of Chapter 11 reorganizations . . . '[t]hese
considerations are insufficient to overcome the clear command of the Sev-
enth Amendment.""' 6 One might arguably construe this statement to rep-
resent the Court's refusal to balance away a constitutional right on the basis
of competing concerns of governmental convenience in a manner not con-
templated in the text or structure of the Constitution, but such a conclusion
is far from clear. Initially, the statement appears inconsistent with the imme-
diately preceding passages, which emphasize both Congress's failure to
consider expressly the jury trial right issue, and the lack of incompatibility
between use of jury trials and bankruptcy adjudication. If the Seventh
Amendment's commands must be adhered to regardless of competing social
policies, why would the Court emphasize the absence of those competing
considerations, at least without appropriately couching that discussion with
the label of dictum?
A conceivable resolution of this internal inconsistency may turn on the
Court's choice of wording. When the Court in Granfinanciera invoked what
could be characterized as the "line-in-the-sand" language from Curtis v.
Loether,"7 it was doing so solely in the context of its discussion of how
the use of jury trials might "impede swift resolution of bankruptcy proceed-
ings and increase the expense of Chapter 11 reorganizations.""' Perhaps
the Court intended to say that while such relatively minimal interferences
with the congressional scheme were "insufficient to overcome the clear
command of the Seventh Amendment,"'"9 total incompatibility, as the
Court apparently found to exist in both Jones & Laughlin and Atlas Roof-
ing, '2 actually would be "sufficient" to outbalance the Seventh Amend-
ment right.
Whether the Granfinanciera Court actually intended such a qualification,
intended its discussion about incompatibility merely as surplusage, or simply
failed to notice the possible inconsistency between its statement and the
public-private right dichotomy, probably matters little in the long run. Close
examination of the Court's unexplained reliance in both Atlas Roofing and
Granfinanciera on the public rights doctrine as a rationale for the congres-
sional power to abandon the jury trial right in non-Article III forums reveals
that the public rights doctrine, at least when applied in the Seventh Amend-
116 Id. at 63 (quoting Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 198 (1974)).
"7 Curtis, 415 U.S. at 198.
... Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 63.
"9 Curtis, 415 U.S. at 198.
2o See discussion supra notes 62, 67, 74 and accompanying text.
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ment context, is fundamentally incoherent. Rather than providing a princi-
pled basis upon which to determine the proper scope of congressional power
to remove the civil jury trial from federal adjudications, reliance on the
public rights doctrine in reality amounts to a fig leaf of constitutional princi-
ple, used to shield the Court's effective abdication of its responsibilities of
judicial review when the Seventh Amendment jury trial right is at stake.
Justice White all but acknowledged this fact in his opinion for the Court in
Atlas Roofing. In that case he made only passing reference to the "public
rights" grounding for the Court's deference to congressional will, 2 ' and
instead expended considerable effort to explain why use of jury trials would
significantly disrupt the congressional scheme. 12  He had recognized much
the same point in his opinion for the Court some eleven years earlier in
Katchen v. Landy,23 which he subsequently reiterated once again in his
dissent in Granfinanciera124
As Granfinanciera shows, use of a fig leaf of principle may occasionally
dictate a departure from the intended total deference to Congress that would
derive from a more open judicial embrace of unadorned functionalism. Such
departures, however, will likely prove to be relatively rare. 25 As a practi-
cal matter, the public rights analysis leaves Congress with enormous and
largely unbridled discretion to circumvent the jury trial right when it deems
it pragmatically advisable to do so. This point is underscored by the myste-
rious absence of even a hint of explanation in any of the Court's opinions
concerning the textual, historical, or conceptual basis for the claimed inter-
section between the public rights doctrine on the one hand and the Seventh
Amendment on the other. Exploration of any conceivable basis for that
intersection reveals how indefensible such a connection is as a matter of
both Seventh Amendment doctrine and constitutional theory.
.2 Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S.
442, 450, 455 (1977); see discussion supra note 73 and accompanying text.
122 Atlas Roofing, 430 U.S. at 450-55; see discussion infra notes 194-96 and accom-
panying text.
23 382 U.S. 323, 339 (1966) (holding that the Bankruptcy Act established a structure
within which a bankruptcy court has summary jurisdiction over a claim for the surren-
der of voidable documents).
124 Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 80, 83 (White, J., dissenting).
'25 See, e.g., Langenkamp v. Culp, 498 U.S. 42, 44-45 (1990) (clarifying
Granfinanciera as determining the availability of a jury trial based on whether the cred-
itor has submitted a claim against the bankruptcy estate, not based on a trustee's prefer-
ence action).
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III. THE PUBLIC RIGHTS-SEVENTH AMENDMENT INTERSECTION:
EXPLORING THE CONCEIVABLE RATIONALES
No one, to our knowledge, has ever suggested that the common law
practice of 1791 in any way determined the use of a jury trial on the basis
of whether the underlying substantive right to be enforced could be charac-
terized as "public" or "private." Hence, the Court's invocation of that dis-
tinction cannot be justified on the basis of the traditionally employed histori-
cal interpretive model of Seventh Amendment construction.126 Thus, if reli-
ance on the public rights doctrine in Seventh Amendment interpretation is to
be explained, it must be by resort to alternative analytical models. Three
such models could be fashioned: the "historical/forum" model, the "condi-
tional waiver" model, and the "functionalist" model. The first two models
conceivably could provide principled constitutional grounding for the appli-
cation of the public rights doctrine to Seventh Amendment interpretation,
but close examination reveals that these models are flawed in the abstract
and not properly applicable in Seventh Amendment interpretation. Although
the third model adequately rationalizes the Court's distinction, that model is
wholly inconsistent with accepted principles of judicial review and Ameri-
can constitutional theory, and therefore must be rejected.
A. The Historical/Forum Model
The "historical/forum" model effectively bridges Article III's interpretive
reliance on the public rights doctrine and the Seventh Amendment historical
mode of interpretation. Under this model, the public rights doctrine has no
direct relevance to Seventh Amendment interpretation. Rather, that doctrine
determines solely whether Congress may transfer federal adjudication to a
non-Article III forum, which is the doctrine's traditional role.'27 The
doctrine's indirect impact on Seventh Amendment interpretation turns on the
assumption that the right to jury trial is not triggered in a non-Article III
proceeding, regardless of either the nature of the relief sought or the histori-
cal practice had the case arisen in a traditional judicial setting. If valid, use
of such a model would comport with the requirements of principled judicial
26 See discussion supra part I. Of course, it could be argued that because most of
today's public rights, enacted by Congress, did not exist in 1791, no jury trial right
applies. Such a conclusion, however, would be inconsistent with the classic Seventh
Amendment interpretive principle of Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433 (1830),
regularly followed by the modem Supreme Court, which focuses primarily on the nature
of the relief sought, rather than on the historical origins of the underlying substantive
rights. See discussion infra notes 142-43 and accompanying text.
127 See discussion supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text.
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review. The Court would simply be holding that Congress may transfer the
adjudication of public rights to a non-Article III forum, and that, purely as a
matter of principled Seventh Amendment construction, the right to a jury
trial does not apply in such proceedings.
While some doctrinal support for this model may be found in both Jones
& Laughlin and Atlas Roofing,2 ' the Court's decision in Granfinanciera
arguably suggests that the Court is not employing the "historical/forum"
model to rationalize its Seventh Amendment jurisprudence. In
Granfinanciera, pursuant to the congressional legislative scheme, the fraudu-
lent conveyance action was heard by a bankruptcy judge, a non-Article III
adjudicator, yet nevertheless the Court held that the jury trial right
applied. 29 If the Court's rationale for the intersection of the public rights
doctrine and the Seventh Amendment was, in fact, the "historical/forum"
rationale, presumably the fact that the fraudulent conveyance action was
heard by a non-Article III adjudicator should have been dispositive, but that
was not the result. Even though the claim was adjudicated by a non-Article
III judge, the fact that a private right was involved in Granfinanciera was
deemed by the Court to render the Seventh Amendment right to jury trial
applicable. 3 ' This analysis suggests the existence of a direct connection
between the public rights doctrine and the-Seventh Amendment, rather than
the indirect connection contemplated by the "historical/forum" rationale.
28 See supra notes 50-73 and accompanying text.
129 Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 64.
130 Mention should be made of the reason that a non-Article III bankruptcy judge was
constitutionally permitted to adjudicate a private right in the first place. Such a practice
may at first appear puzzling, in light of the Supreme Court's finding in Northern Pipe-
line that adjudication of private rights by non-Article III bankruptcy judges was uncon-
stitutional. See supra note 97 and accompanying text. The reason for granting non-Arti-
cle III bankruptcy judges such adjudicative power is that in Northern Pipeline, Justice
Brennan had indicated that non-Article III adjudication could be justified, above and
beyond the public rights doctrine, if the non-Article III adjudicators were "adjuncts" to
the district courts. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S.
50, 76-84 (1982). He concluded, however, that, as constituted under the 1978 Act,
bankruptcy judges independently exercised too much judicial power to be properly
characterized as adjuncts. Id. at 84-86.
In the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, 28 U.S.C. §
1334(b) (1988), Congress responded to Northern Pipeline by reshaping the bankruptcy
courts in order to make them true "adjuncts" to the federal district courts. 28 U.S.C. §
151 (1988) now provides that bankruptcy judges are to constitute a unit of the district
court. Under 28 U.S.C. § 152(a)(1), bankruptcy judges, who are appointed for fourteen-
year terms, "serve as judicial officers of the United States district court established
under Article III of the Constitution." Id. § 152(a)(1). While this action could effective-
ly avoid Article III problems for bankruptcy court adjudication of private rights, it of
course would have no effect on a Seventh Amendment challenge.
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In any event, reliance on the "historical/forum" rationale to justify the
intersection of the public rights doctrine and the Seventh Amendment is
fatally flawed in several important respects. Two ways exist in which the
"historical/forum" model might be thought to justify this intersection-that
which we describe as the "historical executive" rationale and the "new equi-
table forum" rationale. We will consider each separately.
1. The "Historical Executive" Rationale
The essential premise of the "historical executive" sub-model is that,
pursuant to the well-established mode of Seventh Amendment interpretation
tying the jury trial right to analogous historical practice,' that right
should be deemed inapplicable to non-Article III adjudication. This conclu-
sion is reached, the argument proceeds, because the closest common law
analogue to adjudication outside of a traditional judicial forum is direct
executive action by officers of the king, where the jury trial right was of
course inapplicable. On a textual level, under this sub-model, an action in a
non-Article III forum is simply not a "suit" to which the jury trial right
attaches.
Even if the premises of this rationale were fully accepted, it would be
difficult to deem it relevant to adjudication in a non-Article III "legislative"
court. Such courts,' at least when they are adjudicating actual cases or
controversies,'33 resemble Article III courts in every significant respect ex-
cept in their protections of salary and tenure.' This sole distinction hardly
renders the action before the non-Article III adjudicator something other
than a "suit" for purposes of the Seventh Amendment's text. Nor, as a mat-
ter of historical analogy, do these distinctions bring the proceedings under
Article III courts closer to royal executive action than to traditional common
law adjudication, given that English common law judges themselves lacked
protections of salary and tenure.'35 Arguably administrative non-Article III
"' See discussion supra part I.
132 Current examples are territorial courts, military courts, and the Tax Court. See
REDISH, supra note 77, at 53-64.
13' Article III's case-or-controversy requirement does not apply to legislative courts,
though much of their work would fit within the requirement's bounds. See id.
,' This dichotomy may explain the Court's willingness to find the Seventh Amend-
ment right applicable to the non-Article III District of Columbia local courts. Pernell v.
Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 365-69 (1974). Nevertheless, it remains unclear how the
Court would have ruled on the applicability of the Seventh Amendment right if Con-
gress had expressly denied to those courts the authority to conduct civil jury trials. See
supra note 85.
,' Indeed, one of the grievances listed in the Declaration of Independence was the
lack of independence of the King's judiciary. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE
para. 11 (U.S. 1776) ("He has made Judges dependent on his Will alone, for the tenure
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adjudication benefits more from the textual and historical reasoning of the
"historical executive" rationale than does legislative court adjudication.
Although no one could reasonably believe that legislative courts are not
properly deemed "courts," there exists a venerable doctrinal basis for con-
cluding that administrative agencies are not properly described in this man-
ner.'36 The text of the Seventh Amendment, however, makes no reference
to "courts." Rather, it refers solely to "suits." While administrative
rulemaking obviously does not qualify as a "suit," it would defy all reality
to suggest that administrative adjudication of a statutorily created cause of
action on behalf of or against a private individual or entity does not consti-
tute a "suit." Such a proceeding represents a classic illustration of the adver-
sary controversies conceptually and traditionally adjudicated by judicial bod-
ies.'37 Thus, such adjudicatory procedures are hardly analogous to non-ju-
of their offices, and the amount and payment of their salaries.").
136 The Supreme Court first employed a "functional" standard to determine whether
an adjudicatory body constitutes a "court" for purposes of the removal statutes. See
Upshur County v. Rich, 135 U.S. 467 (1890). In Upshur County, the Court held that
despite the fact that removal was from a "county court," the case did not involve a
removable "suit." Id. at 477. The Court reached this conclusion by examining the actual
powers, composition, and procedures of the entity, stating:
The principle ... is, that a proceeding, not in a court of justice, but carried on by
executive officers in the exercise of their proper functions, as in the valuation of
property for the just distribution of taxes or assessments, is purely administrative
in its character, and cannot, in any just sense, be called a suit.
Id.
Under the functional test, many agency actions would be deemed to be the adjudi-
cation of "suits." Although some courts continue to employ the functional test, see, e.g.,
Kolibash v. Committee on Legal Ethics, 872 F.2d 571, 576 (4th Cir. 1989); Floeter v.
C.W. Transp., Inc., 597 F.2d 1100, 1102 (7th Cir. 1979); Volkswagen de P.R., Inc. v.
Puerto Rico Labor Relations Bd., 454 F.2d 38, 41-45 (1st Cir. 1972); others have re-
fused to do so, see, e.g., County of Nassau v. Cost of Living Council, 499 F.2d 1340,
1343 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1974). Recently, one court of appeals stated that "[t]here
is... evidence in other Supreme Court decisions from the same era that Upshur Coun-
ty did not broadly adopt a 'functional test' by which an administrative body would be
treated as a 'court' for federal removal purposes simply because it performs a judicial
function." Sun Buick, Inc. v. Saab Cars USA, Inc., 26 F.3d 1259, 1263 (3d Cir. 1994).
In another opinion, the Third Circuit asked "whether the coercive powers that the ad-
ministrative agency possesses compel compliance with effluent limitations . . . . The
second inquiry concerns the procedural similarities the agency proceeding might have to
a suit in federal court ...." Student Pub. Interest Research Group v. Fritzsche, Dodge
& Olcott, Inc., 759 F.2d 1131, 1137 (3d Cir. 1985).
137 See, e.g., In re Pacific Ry. Comm'n, 32 F. 241, 255 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1887) ("The
term [cases or controversies] implies the existence of present or possible adverse parties
whose contentions are submitted to the court for adjudication."); see also Muskrat v.
United States, 219 U.S. 346, 356-57 (1911) (quoting Justice Field's definition of "cases
or controversies" in In re Pacific Railway Commission).
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dicial royal executive action that may have taken place at the time of the
Seventh Amendment's adoption. In any event, even if accepted, this admin-
istrative agency-legislative court dichotomy could not be rationalized by
resort to the public rights doctrine, because that doctrine draws no such
distinction for purposes of Article III analysis. In its original context, that
doctrine was developed for the sole purpose of distinguishing between Arti-
cle III and non-Article III adjudicatory power.138
2. The "New Equitable Forum" Rationale
An alternate means of explaining the "historical/forum" model is to
argue that adjudication in a non-Article III forum represents a proceeding
wholly unknown at common law and therefore uncontrolled by the Seventh
Amendment, which guarantees the right only as it existed at common law.
Alternatively, one could argue that such forums are appropriately viewed as
inherently equitable in nature because they were created by Congress in
order to avoid the delays and inefficiencies involved in traditional adjudica-
tion. Once again, however, neither explanation can withstand closer analysis.
Initially, the fact that the particular proceeding or forum in question may
not have existed at common law should not automatically remove it from
the command of the Seventh Amendment, any more than the fact that the
particular underlying substantive claim did not exist at common law does
not have this effect. Under Justice Story's Parsons analysis,139 the exis-
tence of the proceeding or cause of action at common law is irrelevant. As
long as the proceeding is appropriately characterized as a "suit," one deter-
mines the claim's legal or equitable nature by examining both the remedy
sought and historical analogies to the underlying action.'" Thus, under
Parsons, a jury trial right will apply regardless of the nature of the forum in
which the suit is to be adjudicated, so long as the case would have been
adjudicated at law had it existed in 1791.l4 As the modem day Supreme
Court has explained, the latter issue is generally resolved by examining the
nature of the relief sought. 42 Hence, if the private plaintiff in an adminis-
trative proceeding sought money damages, or if the government sought a
civil enforcement penalty, those cases would have been adjudicated in courts
13 See discussion supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text.
13 See discussion supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
'4 See discussion supra part I.
Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 447 (1830).
142 See Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 565
(1990) ("The ... inquiry [into the remedy sought] is more important in our analysis.").
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of law, rather than in equity.'43 Under Parsons, then, it matters not at all
that the adjudication takes place in a forum unknown at common law.'14
It is true, of course, that the Supreme Court could avoid this difficulty in
implementing the "new forum" rationale simply by overruling Justice
Story's venerable opinion in Parsons. After all, the Parsons approach does
not inexorably follow from the text of the Seventh Amendment, and the
Court has in the past not deemed Justice Story's opinions to be immune
from subsequent reconsideration in other contexts.'45 The problem, howev-
er, is that the Supreme Court has never suggested that Parsons should be
overruled. To the contrary, it has expressly reaffirmed it on more than one
occasion." Moreover, it is difficult to see how the Court could, at least in
a principled manner, overrule Parsons selectively, so that its holding contin-
ued to apply to adjudication of newly created statutory rights in the Article
III courts. but did not apply to adjudication in newly created non-Article III
proceedings. We return, therefore, to square one-seeking a principled basis
on which to distinguish application of the Seventh Amendment right in
Article III and non-Article III proceedings. Unless the Court were (1) ex-
pressly to overrule Parsons selectively, rendering it inapplicable to non-
Article III proceedings, and (2) to provide some principled basis to support
the position that Parsons's "historical translation" approach applies to new
forums, but not to new causes of action, the "new forum" rationale fails to
justify a special Seventh Amendment rule for non-Article III proceedings.
At this point, at least, the Supreme Court has attempted to do neither.
Even if the mere fact that the forum was created after 1791 does not
justify exclusion of the Seventh Amendment from non-Article III proceed-
ings, such exclusion could be rationalized if those new forums were proper-
ly capable of characterization as exclusively equitable. Such a conclusion
appears inappropriate, however, given that much of the relief awarded in
these proceedings is properly characterized only as the equivalent of classic
legal remedies. Perhaps this conclusion would change were Congress to
label formally the relief awarded in non-Article III proceedings as "equita-
ble." Indeed, there exists some basis in Supreme Court doctrine for the view
that congressional characterization of relief as equitable conclusively re-
moves any question about the possibility of a jury trial right.47 When a
14' Regarding the legal nature of the civil enforcement penalty, see Tull v. United
States, 481 U.S. 412, 422 (1987) ("A civil penalty was a type of remedy at common
law that could only be enforced in courts of law.").
See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
145 For example, the Court, in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938),
overruled Justice Story's famed opinion in Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
"4 See, e.g., Pemell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 374-75 (1974); Curtis v.
Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 193 (1974).
,41 See Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers Local 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 572
(1990). Prior to Terry, however, in Granfinanciera, Justice Brennan stated that as a
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constitutional right turns on the outcome of a factual question, however,
both Supreme Court precedent and accepted principles of constitutional
theory dictate that the judiciary have the final say, lest the majoritarian
branches be given effective power to overrule the countermajoritarian limits
of the Constitution."4 Hence, Congress cannot be given conclusive power
to void the Seventh Amendment right simply by waiving a legislative wand,
characterizing as "equitable" relief that which has historically been deemed
"legal. , 49
Justice White, both in his opinion for the Court in Atlas Roofing 5' and
in his dissent in Granfinanciera,"' found support for the position that the
jury trial right did not apply to the forums in question from the fact that
historically the jury trial right did not extend to every forum. 52 He pointed
to courts of equity and admiralty, as well as to military courts and state
courts as examples of forums in which the Seventh Amendment right has
always been inapplicable. 53 None of these historical examples, however,
provides logical support for the position that the right is similarly inapplica-
ble in non-Article III forums. Even though the forums in the first two exam-
ples cited by Justice White existed in 1791, the Seventh Amendment does
not dictate a jury trial right in those situations for the simple reason that
those forums historically did not employ jury trials. The same is quite prob-
ably true of military courts, where no one appears to have suggested the
historical use of jury trials. In any event, such forums present truly unique
circumstances that have always been thought to distinguish the particular
form of adjudication for virtually every purpose. 54 Finally, the right has
never applied in state courts for the simple reason that no provision of the
Bill of Rights was intended to apply to the states. 155 Accordingly, the Sev-
general matter Congress lacks such power. See Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492
U.S. 33, 51-52 (1989); discussion supra notes 81-88 and accompanying text.
", See, e.g., Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 60 (1932). See generally REDISH, su-
pra note 9; discussion infra notes 185-92 and accompanying text.
"v See Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 52.
50 Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S.
442, 460-61 (1977).
' Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 79-80 (White, J., dissenting).
52 Id. at 80 (White, J., dissenting); Atlas Roofing, 430 U.S. at 449-55.
'13 Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 79 n.5 (White, J., dissenting); Atlas Roofing, 430
U.S. at 458.
114 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17 (1955) (recogniz-
ing special situation of military justice); Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65, 79
(1857) (same).
' Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250 (1833). Although many of the
provisions of the Bill of Rights have been incorporated through the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause, this is not the case for the Seventh Amendment.
See, e.g., Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R., 342 U.S. 359, 365-67 (1952)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring in the judgment).
436 [Vol. 4:2
SEVENTH AMENDMENT IN NON-ARTICLE III PROCEEDINGS
enth Amendment does not impose a jury trial right in state court, even in
purely legal actions. Justice White's reliance on the state court analogy
therefore proves too much. Analogizing the Seventh Amendment's role in
federal courts to its role in state courts would effectively do away with the
jury trial right altogether.
An argument might be fashioned, however, that actions in non-Article
III forums are properly viewed as equitable, to which no jury trial right
attaches because the "remedy at law"-adjudication that includes a jury
trial-would be prohibitively burdensome, and therefore "inadequate." The
fact, however, that use of jury trial makes adjudication more burdensome or
inefficient, has, as a general matter,'56 never served as an adequate basis
for characterizing a case as equitable rather than legal.'57 Thus, use of such
an analysis would distort the Seventh Amendment's historical directive
beyond recognition.
B. The "Conditional Waiver" Model
We have already seen that the inapplicability of the Seventh Amendment
right to non-Article III proceedings cannot properly be rationalized by resort
to the traditional historical inquiry of Seventh Amendment analysis. An
alternative analysis that could conceivably rationalize such a conclusion is
the "conditional waiver" model. Unlike the "historical/forum" model, which
at least purports to rationalize the virtual mutual exclusivity between the
jury trial right and the use of non-Article III forums by resorting to interpre-
tation of the Seventh Amendment,'58 the "conditional waiver" model be-
gins with the assumption that the Seventh Amendment does in fact provide
a jury trial right in non-Article III proceedings when legal relief is sought.
The model excludes the jury trial right, not on the basis of internal constitu-
tional interpretation, but rather on the basis of some form of the logical
proposition that "the-greater-includes-the-lesser." Under this interpretation,
the very same reasoning that leads to application of the "public rights" ex-
ception to the requirement of Article III adjudication likewise simultaneous-
ly leads to the conclusion that Congress may revoke the jury trial right in,
and only in, the adjudication of public rights.
The model's reasoning, which has never been expressly adopted by the
Court in its decisions interpreting either the Seventh Amendment or Article
156 The one exception where complexity could have transformed a legal issue into an
equitable one was an accounting. See discussion supra note 27.
117 See discussion supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
58 But see Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 51-55 (1989) (finding a
Seventh Amendment jury trial right in a non-Article III court, where a private right as
opposed to a public right was being litigated); discussion supra notes 81-88 and accom-
panying text.
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III, 59 is that because Congress is not constitutionally obligated to create
public rights in the first place and is in any event protected against suit by
sovereign immunity, Congress logically can take the "lesser" step of creat-
ing the right and allowing itself to be sued in certain circumstances. Accord-
ingly, Congress could condition the receipt of a public right on the
recipient's implicit agreement to waive either adjudication of that right in an
Article III forum, the right to jury trial, or both.
If this logic were ever to be accepted, however, it could occur only in a
situation in which Congress had created a right, and the adjudication in
question had been brought by the recipient to enforce that right. It is only
under those circumstances that the logic of "the-greater-includes-the-lesser"
applies even superficially, for it is only in this situation that the private
party is receiving a benefit that the government was not obligated to pro-
vide. Unless the government is providing a benefit to which the individual
had no independent right, the government cannot rely on the premise that its
greater power not to provide the benefit at all logically implies its power to
provide the benefit subject to waiver of preexisting rights or other limita-
tions. Thus, in a case in which the government is seeking to impose a bur-
den or penalty upon a private party rather than providing a benefit, this
reasoning is rendered completely irrelevant.
If one were to consider a case, such as Atlas Roofing,"6 in which the
government sought to act coercively to enforce a statutorily-imposed obli-
gation against a private individual or entity, reliance on the logic of "the
greater-includes-the-lesser" would be absurd. The government could not
rationally say to that party: "We did not have to impose this obligation on
you in the first place; therefore, we can take the lesser step of imposing the
obligation on you only on the condition that you waive your constitutional
rights to an Article III forum and/or a jury trial." In response, there can be
little doubt that the private party would choose to decline the "obligation."
In all likelihood, that is why the rule is referred to as the public "rights"
doctrine, rather than the public "obligations" doctrine. The same logical
defect applies to a case brought by one private party to enforce a statutorily
created right against another private party. While the "greater-includes-the-
lesser" logic could conceivably work as to the plaintiff, surely it would be
truly Orwellian to apply it to the coerced defendant.
Presumably for these reasons, Justice Scalia, in his separate opinion in
Granfinanciera, argued that the definition of a "public right" should be
confined to suits in which the government is a party acting in its sovereign
capacity. 6' Under the logic just described, however, even Justice Scalia's
"' It should be recalled, however, that the Court has failed to provide any alternative
explanation.
"~ See discussion supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text.
161 Justice Scalia observed:
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model is defective, because it is not sufficiently confined. Because all Jus-
tice Scalia demands is that the government be a party-presumably either as
a defendant or a plaintiff-his approach would illogically reach situations
(like that in Atlas Roofing) where the government is acting coercively. In
any event, the Court has not so confined the concept. Although Justice
Brennan's plurality opinion in Northern Pipeline suggested "that a matter of
public rights must at a minimum arise 'between the government and oth-
ers,' ' 6 2 in the subsequent decision of Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricul-
tural Products Co., the Court nevertheless held that Congress may exclude
cases from Article III adjudication where Congress has "create[d] a seem-
ingly 'private' right that is so closely integrated into a public regulatory
scheme as to be... appropriate for agency resolution with limited involve-
ment by the Article III judiciary. ,1 63 Even Justice Brennan, in a separate
concurring opinion in Thomas, agreed with the assumption that the govern-
ment need not be a party to the action in order to render a case an adjudica-
tion of "public rights. ,1 64 Surely, then, the "greater-includes-the-lesser"
logic cannot justify a Seventh Amendment exception for adjudication of
public rights, at least under the broad scope of the Court's current definition
of that phrase.1
65
In my view a matter of "public rights," whose adjudication Congress may assign
to tribunals lacking the essential characteristics of Article III courts, "must at a
minimum 'arise between the government and others."' Until quite recently this
has also been the consistent view of the Court....
The notion that the power to adjudicate a legal controversy between two
private parties may be assigned to a non-Article III, yet federal, tribunal is entire-
ly inconsistent with the origins of the public rights doctrine....
It is clear that what we meant by public rights were not rights important to
the public, or rights created by the public, but rights of the public-that is, rights
pertaining to claims brought by or against the United States. For central to our
reasoning was the device of waiver of sovereign immunity, as a means of con-
verting a subject which, though its resolution involved a "judicial act," could not
be brought before the courts, into the stuff of an Article III "judicial controversy."
Waiver of sovereign immunity can only be implicated, of course, in suits where
the Government is a party.
Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 65-66, 68 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment) (citations omitted).
162 Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 69 (1982)
(quoting Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 451 (1929)).
163 Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 594 (1985).
"6 Id. at 598 (Brennan, J., concurring).
165 It should once again be emphasized that even if the Court were to refine its mod-
em approach to the public rights doctrine in keeping with Justice Scalia's concurrence
in Granfinanciera, the "greater-includes-the-lesser" logic that underlies the "conditional
waiver" model is wholly inapplicable in cases in which the government, suing as a
plaintiff, is acting coercively. See discussion supra note 161 and accompanying text.
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Even if the Court were to do something it has never done and confine
the concept of public rights to the narrow category of adjudications brought
by a private party against the government to vindicate a statutorily-created
right, both logical and practical problems would continue to plague the
doctrine's use as a rationale for exclusion of the Seventh Amendment right
from non-Article III proceedings. Initially, there appears to be no way to
confine the doctrine's logic to cases of non-Article III adjudication. If the
Court is proceeding on the assumption that the private party has waived a
constitutional right because of the principle that "the-greater-includes-the-
lesser," then there is no logical reason why Congress could not deny right to
a jury trial, even in those proceedings heard in an Article III court. The
same logical implications thought to derive from the government's voluntary
choice to create the right and to allow itself to be sued to enforce it are
relevant, regardless of the nature of the adjudicatory forum employed.
One might respond that if and when the question of the applicability of
the "greater-includes-the-lesser" clearly presents itself, the Court actually
would reach such a conclusion. Although the Court asserted in Curtis v.
Loether that competing policy considerations cannot overcome the Seventh
Amendment's "clear command,"'" commentators have noted that Con-
gress had failed to make clear, in the underlying statute, its choice against
the use of jury trial, and that it is uncertain what the Court would have done
had Congress made such a decision clear.167 Given that the Court in both
Atlas Roofing and Jones & Laughlin emphasized the administrative nature
of the forum,168 application of the public rights analysis to determine the
scope of the Seventh Amendment right in Article III courts would represent
a substantial extension. Yet the fact remains that use of the "conditional
waiver" rationale would seem to be as applicable to such proceedings as it
is in administrative adjudication.
One should hardly express pleasure at the prospect that the Court actual-
ly might extend the "logic" of the public rights doctrine to encompass the
loss of the jury trial right in Article III adjudications, as well as non-Article
III proceedings. The fundamental problem with the "conditional waiver"
rationale of the public rights exception, even when that term is given its
narrowest definition,169 is that it completely ignores the salutary limitations
imposed by the so-called "unconstitutional conditions" doctrine. Under that
doctrine, Congress may not condition receipt of a benefit on the waiver of a
" Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 198 (1974); see discussion supra note 43 and
accompanying text.
1 See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 45, at 504.
'6 Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S.
442, 455 (1977); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 46-49 (1936).
69 By "narrowest definition," we mean confining the doctrine to cases in which a
private party is suing the government to enforce a statutorily created right. See discus-
sion supra notes 159-60 and accompanying text.
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constitutional right. 7° While the Court has on occasion construed the doc-
trine in a manner that may unduly narrow its reach, 1' it continues to stand
for the proposition that government may not employ its awesome power
effectively to pressure private individuals into the waiver of constitutional
rights.' Under these circumstances, the doctrine posits, such waiver can-
not reasonably be deemed to represent a truly voluntary choice.' Perhaps
there exist principled means by which the Court could distinguish either or
both the Seventh Amendment and Article III contexts from those situations
normally reached by the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. The Court,
however, has not attempted to fashion such a principled distinction, quite
probably because the Court has never expressly acknowledged that the "con-
170 See, e.g., Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518-19 (1958). See generally Richard
A. Epstein, The Supreme Court 1987 Term, Foreword: Unconstitutional Conditions,
State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARv. L. REV. 4 (1988) (discussing mo-
nopoly power of government as potentially raising issue of unconstitutional coercion);
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1415 (1989)
(arguing that conditioning benefits on rights skews power between government and
rightholders).
"'J See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 196-200 (1991). At issue in Rust were regula-
tions regarding Title X of the Public Health Service Act, which provides federal funds
for family planning services. Id. at 178. The regulations in question specified that a
Title X project could not provide counseling concerning, referrals for, or advocacy of
abortion. Id. at 179-80.
172 See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2317 (1994). See generally
sources cited supra note 170.
173 According to Professor Sullivan:
The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions holds that government may not
grant a benefit on the condition that the beneficiary surrender a constitutional
right, even if the government may withhold that benefit altogether. It reflects the
triumph of the view that government may not do indirectly what it may not do
directly over the view that the greater power to deny a benefit includes the lesser
power to impose a condition on its receipt.
Sullivan, supra note 170, at 1415.
Professor Sullivan argues "that the doctrine has not been applied often enough." Id.
at 1418. She suggests, however, that "a focus on coercion [as a rationale for the doc-
trine] is unlikely to be helpful." Id. at 1420. Instead, she contends that the focus should
be
on the systemic effect of conditions on the distribution of rights in the polity as a
whole. Unconstitutional conditions implicate three distributive concerns. The first
is the boundary between the public and the private realms, which government can
shift through the allocation of benefits as readily through the use or threat of
force.... The second distributive concern of [the] unconstitutional conditions
doctrine is the maintenance of government neutrality or evenhandedness among
rightholders. The third is the prevention of constitutional caste ....
Id. at 1421.
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ditional waiver" rationale actually explaifis the public rights doctrine's con-
nection to interpretation of either Article III or the Seventh Amendment.
At least in the context of Article III interpretation, the modem Court has
available to it the support of precedent to justify its use of the public rights
doctrine,'74 though at no point do any of the early cases provide an expla-
nation for the connection. Even less explanation was provided, however, for
Atlas Roofing's intersection of the public rights analysis with the right to
jury trial in non-Article III forums. As our discussion has shown, once one
attempts to explicate this intersection, one immediately recognizes the gross
disparity between the intersection and accepted constitutional doctrine. The
only remaining explanation for the judicial deference imposed by the public
rights doctrine, then, is a theory of unadorned functionalism. It is therefore
to an examination of that theory that we now turn.
C. The "Functionalist-Abdication" Model
1. The Proper Role of Functionalism in Constitutional Theory
On the broadest level, the theory of functionalism in constitutional re-
view posits that the scope of constitutional dictates may be shaped or influ-
enced, at least in part, by the social, political, or practical implications that
arise from conceivable interpretations.'75 More often than not, however,
the theory has meant that otherwise applicable constitutional dictates can be
made to give way in the face of competing social or political interests.'76
Although Alexander Bickel argued that inclusion of functionalist consider-
ations as part of the judicial review process represented wholly unprincipled
and illegitimate exercises of the judiciary's role,' in certain instances
such considerations are perfectly consistent with the proper performance of
judicial review. For example, where the Fourth Amendment prohibits only
"unreasonable" searches and seizures, ' examination of functional con-
cerns is not only permitted but textually required, as an element of the judi-
"' See cases cited supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
171 See generally Martin H. Redish, Separation of Powers, Judicial Authority, and the
Scope of Article III: The Troubling Cases of Morrison and Mistretta, 39 DEPAUL L.
REV. 299 (1990) (criticizing alternative analytical models for deciding separation of
powers cases, especially in regards to Morrison v. Olson and Mistretta v. United States,
and arguing that a formal separationist model ought to be applied).
76 See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988). See generally MARTIN H.
REDISH, THE CONSTITUTION AS POLITICAL STRUCTURE 99-134 (1995) (analyzing doc-
trinal models for deciding separation of powers cases, and advocating a "pragmatic
formalist" model).
' See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 24 (2d ed. 1986).
178 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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cial interpretation of the term "unreasonable." Functionalist considerations
also would seem to be textually appropriate, at least to a limited extent, 7 9
in the interpretation of the constitutional dictate of procedural due pro-
cess.
80
Where the relevant constitutional text does not, on its face, incorporate a
case-by-case assessment of functionalist considerations, judicial limitation of
a constitutional directive on functionalist grounds may nevertheless be ap-
propriate under limited circumstances. Limited consideration of
functionalism may be proper, for example, under a theory of "pragmatic
formalism," which allows functional considerations to influence the judicial
definition of ambiguous constitutional terminology.'' Additionally, limited
use of functionalism is quite probably appropriate when exclusion of func-
tionalist concerns would cause such extreme harm or disruption that if a
reviewing court were forced to choose between total protection and total
non-protection, it would as a practical matter have to choose the latter."2
Outside of these three contexts, judicial reliance on functionalist consid-
erations as a basis for limiting an otherwise unlimited constitutional dictate
is indefensible as a matter of American constitutional theory. To be sure, in
the face of a choice between several equally plausible textual constructions,
the reviewing court's assessment of their respective impact on social policy
will be all but inescapable. 3 Absent such circumstances, however, noth-
ing in the judiciary's intended role in the constitutional process authorizes it
to sit in judgment on the wisdom of the constitutional provisions that it is
asked to interpret and enforce. Exercise of such unlimited policymaking
power would be inconsistent with the limited function of an unrepresentative
and unaccountable judiciary in a constitutional democracy, and would threat-
en a society's ability to insulate rights from simple majoritarian revoca-
tion." 4
As problematic as such judicially determined functionalism may be,
even more troubling is what we label a "functionalist-abdication" model. In
' A minimum floor of process must be required, lest the due process protection be
rendered meaningless. See Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory
Independence and the Values of Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 472-74
(1986).
80 See U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319, 332-35 (1976) (imposing utilitarian balancing test as measure of proce-
dural due process).
181 See REDISH, supra note 176, at 101 (suggesting that under "pragmatic formalism,"
a court should define linguistically ambiguous terms by means of "a combination of
policy, tradition, precedent, and linguistic analysis").
82 An example would be the First Amendment right of free speech. U.S. CONST.
amend. I.
"' See REDISH, supra note 176, at 9-10.
184 See id. at 3-22.
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judicially determined functionalism, the reviewing court itself retains the
final authority to decide whether, in a particular case, competing social or
political concerns outbalance an otherwise applicable constitutional dictate.
In contrast, under a "functionalist-abdication" model the political branches
of the federal government make the final, unreviewable, or at least unre-
viewed, decision as to whether social concerns sufficiently counterbalance a
constitutional command to justify abandonment or restriction of that com-
mand. A variation of the "functionalist-abdication" model that is in many
ways even more pernicious is the "definitional abdication" model of judicial
review. Pursuant to this model, a reviewing court, while purporting to test
governmental action by the terms of the Constitution, will accept unques-
tioningly the majoritarian branches' characterization of their actions as fall-
ing within the terms of constitutional directives. Such an approach arguably
presents greater dangers than a pure "functionalist-abdication" model, be-
cause it conveys an illusion of judicial scrutiny that may provide govern-
mental action with considerably greater legitimacy in the eyes of the public
than it deserves.'85 Use of this model effectively turns our constitutional
democratic system on its head, by giving ultimate interpretive power to the
very majoritarian branches sought to be held in check by the
countermajoritarian Constitution.
To grasp this obvious but compelling element of American constitutional
theory, one need only recall the words of Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury
v. Madison:
The powers of the legislature are defined, and limited; and
that those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the con-
stitution is written. To what purpose are powers limited, and
to what purpose is that limitation committed to writing, if
these limits may, at any time, be passed by those intended to
be restrained? The distinction, between a government with
limited and unlimited powers, is abolished, if those limits do
not confine the persons on whom they are imposed, and if
acts prohibited and acts allowed, are of equal obligation. It is
a proposition too plain to be contested, that the constitution
controls any legislative act repugnant to it; or, that the legis-
lature may alter the constitution by an ordinary act.
85 In a long line of decisions, the Supreme Court has rejected the "definitional abdi-
cation" model as a legitimate mode of judicial review. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S.
184, 190 n.6 (1964); St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 49-52
(1936); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 54-59 (1932); Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S.
276, 282-85 (1922). The model has received its greatest acceptance, albeit implicitly,
from the Supreme Court in its interpretation of the Seventh Amendment. See discussion
infra part III.C.2.
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Between these alternatives there is no middle ground.
The constitution is either a superior, paramount law, un-
changeable by ordinary means, or it is on a level with ordi-
nary legislative acts, and like other acts, is alterable when the
legislature shall please to alter it.
If the former part of the alternative be true, then a legis-
lative act contrary to the constitution is not law: if the latter
part be true, then written constitutions are absurd attempts,
on the part of the people, to limit a power in its own nature
illimitable.
Certainly all those who have framed written constitutions
contemplate them as forming the fundamental and paramount
law of the nation, and consequently the theory of every such
government must be, that an act of the legislature, repugnant
to the constitution, is void."8 6
The Constitution is framed in mandatory, rather than advisory terms, and is
subject to a stringent supermajoritarian amendment process.1 7 The fact
that in Article III the framers simultaneously insulated the federal judiciary
from direct majoritarian pressures 8 and vested the judiciary with authority
to adjudicate cases arising under the Constitution"8 9 makes clear their un-
derstanding that the courts would act as interpreters and enforcers of the
nation's governing document."' Such an approach makes perfect sense, as
one of us has previously argued:
It should not be difficult to determine that when the
majoritarian branch is allowed to act as the final arbiter of
the counter-majoritarian constitutional limitations on its au-
thority, at least as a practical matter there are no limitations
at all. Indeed, one should need to draw only on common
sense and generic experience to make this realization....
All one need do to grasp the point is to imagine a litigation
between two parties, where the final decision is to be made
86 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176-77 (1803) (emphasis added).
87 "The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall
propose Amendments to this Constitution... which ... shall be valid to all Intents and
Purposes, as part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths
of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof .... " U.S. CONST. art.
V.
8 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (providing protections of salary and tenure).
189 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
'9g See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 524-25 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke
ed., 1961).
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by one of those parties. Just as it would be absurd to sup-
pose that the resolution of such a case could be deemed fair,
so, too, is it absurd to imagine that one majoritarian branch
could be universally trusted to make a fair assessment of a
constitutional challenge to its actions.19
As basic as the concept of independent judicial review is to our constitution-
al structure, 92 in the context of the Seventh Amendment right in non-Arti-
cle III proceedings, the conclusion appears inescapable that the "functional-
ist-abdication" model has provided the driving force behind the Supreme
Court's doctrine.
2. The "Functionalist-Abdication" Model in Seventh Amendment Interpretation
Whatever cryptic and conclusory references the Court has made to the
public rights doctrine in its construction of the Seventh Amendment in non-
Article III proceedings, and whatever its feeble attempts to place that con-
struction within the logical flow of traditional Seventh Amendment interpre-
tation, when the dust settles there can be little doubt that some form of
functionalism underlies the Court's current doctrinal outlook. The total and
obvious inadequacy of the alternative interpretive models should, standing
alone, provide sufficient proof of this assertion.'93 If one demands more
supporting evidence, we need only look at the Court's words. For example,
Justice White's opinion for the Court in Atlas Roofing made a number of
important references to the functional implications of the Seventh
Amendment's application to administrative proceedings.'94 Additionally,
the Court has noted, on other occasions, the "incompatibility" between the
jury trial right and the administrative process, as if that factor somehow
were deemed to be dispositive of the litigants' constitutional right.95 In-
deed, even Justice Brennan, author of Granfinanciera, noted in a subsequent
opinion that despite the fact that legal relief is sought, the jury trial right is
'9' See REDISH, supra note 9, at 81.
'92 Note that under the "political question" doctrine, the Supreme Court has indicated
that under narrowly defined circumstances, the judiciary will decline to review a consti-
tutional issue. See, e.g., Nixon v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 732, 735 (1993). The doc-
trine may be attacked because of its stark inconsistency with judicial review theory. See
REDISH, supra note 9, at 111-36. The doctrine, however, is extremely narrow in scope.
Thus, even if accepted, it would have no conceivable applicability to the Seventh
Amendment issue.
193 See discussion supra part III.A-B.
'9' Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S.
442, 450 (1977); see discussion supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text.
'9' Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 194 (1974); see discussion supra notes 65-67 and
accompanying text.
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inapplicable when "Congress has permissibly delegated the particular dispute
to a non-Article III decisionmaker and jury trials would frustrate Congress'
[sic] purposes in enacting a particular statutory scheme."'96
Even more troubling than the Court's apparent reliance on functionalism
is its use of the "functionalist-abdication" model. In possible contrast to the
Court's use of functionalism in the interpretation of the reach of Article
III,197 in its Seventh Amendment construction in non-Article III contexts,
the Court appears rarely to have proceeded on the assumption that it retains
meaningful authority to review and reject the congressional determination.
Rather, the Court appears to assume implicitly that in every instance in
which Congress has made the judgment that a full blown jury trial before an
Article III court would be inefficient or inadvisable, that judgment is dis-
positive. Even in Granfinanciera, the one decision that actually invalidated
the failure of Congress to provide a jury trial right before a non-Article III
adjudicator,'98 the Court's words arguably implied that had Congress made
an explicit judgment that the Seventh Amendment right should be deemed
inapplicable, that judgment would have been accorded substantial, and possi-
bly dispositive, weight.'
Possibly even more pernicious to the values of judicial review is the
Court's occasional use in its Seventh Amendment doctrine of "definitional
abdication." Under this practice, the Court purports to enforce the Seventh
Amendment as a countermajoritarian limitation on Congress, yet totally
defers to congressional conclusions concerning the equitable or legal nature
of a particular action.2°° As a result, any time Congress wishes, it may ef-
196 Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 574-75
(1990) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (emphasis add-
ed).
19 When Justice White first fashioned an Article III balancing test in his Northern
Pipeline dissent, he suggested that "Article III is not to be read out of the Constitution;
rather, it should be read as expressing one value that must be balanced against compet-
ing constitutional values and legislative responsibilities. This Court retains the final
word on how that balance is to be struck." Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon
Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 113 (1982) (White, J., dissenting). Whether the Court's
subsequent applications of this type of test in Thomas and Schor meet this standard,
however, is unclear. See discussion supra notes 99-107 and accompanying text.
'98 See discussion supra notes 81-88 and accompanying text.
'99 Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 61 & n.16 (1989). The Court
noted thz.t "[t]o be sure, we owe some deference to Congress' [sic] judgment after it
has given careful consideration to the constitutionality of a legislative provision." Id. at
61.
200 See, e.g., Terry, 494 U.S. at 558. In Terry, the Court considered "whether an
employee who seeks relief in the form of backpay for a union's alleged breach of its
duty of fair representation has a right to trial by jury." Id. at 561. The Union argued
"that the backpay relief sought here must.., be considered equitable because this
Court has labeled backpay awarded under Title VII ... as equitable." Id. at 571. Title
1995]
448 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 4:2
fectively circumvent the Seventh Amendment jury trial right simply by
characterizing the relief provided by a particular statue as "equitable."
Such "definitional abdication" has, as a traditional matter, quite rightly
been inconsistent with American constitutional theory, as demonstrated by
the so-called "constitutional fact" doctrine in Crowell v. Benson,20 1 and
similarly decided cases. 212 It is therefore highly doubtful that the Court
would engage in such definitional deference in virtually any area of consti-
tutional interpretation other than the Seventh Amendment. Thus, although
the Court has not always been consistent in its invocation of this form of
deference, °3 the fact that it has done so at all largely distinguishes its Sev-
enth Amendment jurisprudence from traditional constitutional analysis.
Two potential problems plague our characterization of unadorned
functionalism as the underlying rationale for the Court's approach to the
VII provides that "the court may ... order such affirmative action as may be appro-
priate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees,
with or without back pay .... or any other equitable relief as the court deems appro-
priate." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1988). The Court rejected the Union's argument, in
part because "Congress specifically characterized backpay under Title VII as a form of
'equitable relief.' . . . Congress made no similar pronouncement regarding the duty of
fair representation." Terry, 494 U.S. at 572 (citation omitted).
2'0 "In cases brought to enforce constitutional rights, the judicial power of the United
States necessarily extends to the independent determination of all questions, both of fact
and law, necessary to the performance of that supreme function." Crowell v. Benson,
285 U.S. 22, 60 (1932). The Court in Crowell framed the issue as "whether the Con-
gress may substitute for constitutional courts ... an administrative agency ... for the
final determination of the existence of the facts upon which the enforcement of the
constitutional rights of the citizens depend." Id. at 56.
202 See St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 49-53 (1936); Ng
Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 282-85 (1922); Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon
Borough, 253 U.S. 287, 289-91 (1920). While it has been thought that Crowell's "con-
stitutional fact" doctrine has atrophied, see, e.g., Bernard Schwartz, Does the Ghost of
Crowell v. Benson Still Walk?, 98 U. PA. L. REv. 163 (1949), to the extent this is true,
it is largely because the substantive due process protection of property rights involved
in Crowell has itself atrophied in Supreme Court doctrine. In the area of personal liber-
ty, the "constitutional fact" doctrine remains viable. See, e.g., Cross v. United States,
512 F.2d 1212, 1217 n.7 (4th Cir. 1975) (referring to Crowell favorably); Feinberg v.
FDIC, 522 F.2d 1335, 1342 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (same); see MARTIN H. REDISH & GENE
R. NICHOL, FEDERAL COURTS: CASES, COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS 176 (3d ed. 1994).
203 In Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989), the Court refused to
defer to Congress's decision to characterize a fraudulent conveyance action brought by
the trustee in bankruptcy as a "core" bankruptcy proceeding, which would have ren-
dered the action purely equitable as a historical matter. See id. at 60-61 ("Congress
simply reclassified a pre-existing, common-law cause of action that was not integrally
related to the reformation of debtor-creditor relations and that apparently did not suffer
from any grave deficiencies. This purely taxonomic change cannot alter our Seventh
Amendment analysis.") (footnote omitted).
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role of the Seventh Amendment in non-Article III proceedings. First, one
might question the accuracy of such an assertion, in light of the Court's
continued emphasis on the presence of a public right as a prerequisite to a
finding of Seventh Amendment inapplicability. If the Court truly were em-
ploying a "functionalist-abdication" model, the argument might proceed, it
should matter little whether the underlying substantive right is deemed to be
public or private. Second, one might argue that if unadorned functionalism
accurately reflected the Court's Seventh Amendment doctrine, there would
be no logical means of confining the congressional deference to cases in-
volving non-Article III forums. Congress could just as easily conclude that
use of juries in Article III court proceedings would disrupt achievement of
its legislative goals. Neither of these concerns, however, effectively under-
mines the perception that in its essence, the Court's doctrine concerning the
Seventh Amendment's role in non-Article III proceedings amounts to use of
a "functionalist-abdication" model.
The Court's reliance on the "public rights" doctrine as a basis for defer-
ence to Congress amounts to little more than a thin veil of principle for the
vast functionalist deference that is at work.2 4 Initially, this view is sup-
ported by the absence of any logical explanation for the Seventh Amend-
ment-public rights intersection. 5 Secondly, as it has evolved in its origi-
nal context of Article III interpretation, the public rights doctrine itself has
degenerated into a type of functionalist analysis. No longer is the doctrine
conceptually confined to cases in which the government is a party. Instead,
the key inquiry in a public rights doctrine analysis is whether even a seem-
ingly "private" right is ancillary to a broader legislative scheme.2
One could perhaps make a case for the proposition that a true "function-
alist-abdication" model should logically extend to Article III court adjudica-
tion, as well as to adjudications in non-Article III forums. In fact, it remains
uncertain whether the Court actually would adopt so deferential a model of
judicial review were Congress to make clear its decision to exclude the jury
trial right from Article III court proceedings.2"7 If the Court ultimately
were to draw a distinction for Seventh Amendment purposes between Arti-
cle III and non-Article III proceedings, however, the explanation could well
be that the Court has adopted a partial functionalist model. Under this analy-
sis, a congressional decision to require that use of non-Article III adjudica-
tion, or at least administrative non-Article III adjudication,2 8 automatically
constitutes sufficient grounds for deference to the congressional judgment
that use of jury trial would be inappropriate. Paradoxically, then, such an
204 See discussion supra notes 110-25 and accompanying text.
205 See discussion supra notes 74-80 and accompanying text.
206 See discussion supra notes 87-103 and accompanying text.
207 See discussion supra notes 45, 113-15 and accompanying text.
20 See discussion supra note 194 and accompanying text.
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analysis would represent a form of "partial" total deference. In other words,
under specified circumstances, that is, when Congress transfers adjudication
to a non-Article III forum, the Court will not question the wisdom of con-
gressional judgment concerning the incompatibility between legislative goals
and the use of jury trials.
Whether the Court's use of the "functionalist-abdication" model is ulti-
mately to be limited to the non-Article III context, however, is largely be-
side the point from the broader perspective of constitutional theory. Except
in limited circumstances,2. 9 the provisions of the Bill of Rights are not
abandoned merely because their use would give rise to political or social
inconvenience. Even the fact that enforcement of a constitutional right
would severely disrupt a congressional scheme must be deemed irrelevant,
lest our essential constitutional structure be turned on its head. By way of
contrast, few constitutional theorists today would suggest that the First
Amendment right of free expression must give way merely because its en-
forcement would be "incompatible" with a congressional scheme.21° Cer-
tainly, such an approach would be inconsistent with current free speech
doctrine.211 Congress could not, for example, constitutionally prohibit criti-
cism of one of its legislative programs because such criticism could have
the effect of undermining achievement of the program's social goals. A
greater departure from our constitutional scheme would result from total
judicial deference to a congressional determination concerning that incom-
patibility.2 "2 The Court has provided absolutely no principled basis on
which to distinguish, for these purposes, the Seventh Amendment right to
jury trial from the First Amendment right of free expression.
IV. THE STRICT HISTORICAL ALTERNATIVE
There exists one means by which the Court conceivably could justify its
deference to Congress in at least most non-Article III adjudications. The
Court has never openly considered this method, quite probably because its
adoption would inexorably confine the scope of the jury trial right in con-
texts beyond the relatively limited situations of non-Article III adjudication
or express congressional override. For the most part, no one today disputes
that the Seventh Amendment dictates a resort to historical practice at the
time of the amendment's adoption in order to determine the modern scope
of the jury trial right. 3 One could reasonably debate, however, exactly
209 See discussion supra notes 178-84 and accompanying text.
Generally, when expression is sought to be regulated, government must establish a
compelling interest. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 270 (1981).
21 See, e.g., Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 75 (1983) (holding
unconstitutional, as a violation of the First Amendment, a federal statute prohibiting the
mailing of unsolicited advertisements for contraceptives).
212 See discussion supra notes 185-92 and accompanying text.
213 But see generally Kenneth S. Klein, The Myth of How to Interpret the Seventh
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how tied to historical practice the Seventh Amendment inquiry should be.
Under Justice Story's modernizing approach in Parsons v. Bedford, a court
is to apply the jury trial right even to substantive rights that have been creat-
ed since 1791, as long as a jury trial would have been employed at that time
had the cause of action existed.2"4
Largely-and maybe only-because of Parsons, a Seventh Amendment
issue arises in the case of non-Article III adjudication. Under the public
rights doctrine, Congress has power to vest adjudicatory power in such tri-
bunals only when Congress has created the substantive right.215 Mean-
while, even absent Parsons, the Seventh Amendment might present a prob-
lem for congressionally created rights that replace preexisting common law
rights. In the case of most rights enacted by Congress, this problem is not
likely to present an obstacle. Nor should the principle of stare decisis pres-
ent a significant hurdle to the abandonment of Parsons. Stare decisis always
has been thought to play a more limited role in constitutional adjudica-
tion."'
There exists no principled basis on which to confine the impact of
Parsons's abandonment to cases of congressional action. If Parsons's mod-
ernizing directive were to be ignored, the Seventh Amendment would have
to be deemed inapplicable in all contexts in which a newly created substan-
tive right is the subject of adjudication, regardless of whether Congress has
affirmatively acted to exclude jury trial. Thus, the Seventh Amendment's
relevance to modem federal court litigation would be dramatically reduced
under an abandonment of Parsons. Such a result would be wholly inconsis-
tent with the Court's doctrinal expansion, over the last 35 years, of the Sev-
enth Amendment right in cases in which Congress has not expressly exclud-
ed a jury trial. 7 Because there is no constitutional right to a non-jury tri-
al, 218 Congress could choose to provide a statutorily-created jury trial right
in adjudications of substantive rights created after 1791. In the numerous
situations in which Congress has remained silent on this issue, however,
Amendment Right to a Civil Jury Trial, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1005 (1992) (proposing an
analysis driven by the policies and principles sought to be effectuated through the civil
jury system rather than a "patchwork" historical test). See also Wolfram, supra note 25,
at 731, 744-47 (exposing his "serious dissatisfaction with the historical test" and
proposing a "dynamic" reading of the Seventh Amendment).
214 Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 447 (1830); see discussion supra notes
39-42 and accompanying text.
25 See discussion supra notes 68-80 and accompanying text.
216 See, e.g., Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 543 (1962). This is not to say
that stare decisis plays no role in constitutional adjudication. See, e.g., Planned Parent-
hood v. Casey, 114 S. Ct. 909 (1994).
27 See discussion supra part I.
218 See WRIGHT, supra note 29, at 653.
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abandonment of Parsons would result in a dramatic retrenchment of the
existing constitutional right.
The Court's current doctrinal structure effectively draws a rough dichot-
omy between cases of express congressional exclusion of jury trial, or at
least congressional transfer to a non-Article III forum combined with such
express exclusion," 9 on the one hand, and those in which Congress re-
mains silent on the jury trial question, on the other. Although abandonment
of Parsons would exclude the constitutional right from many cases in which
it currently applies, it would continue to allow Congress to exclude jury trial
while simultaneously providing the Court's Seventh Amendment jurispru-
dence with a coherence and level of principled analysis woefully absent
under its current structure.
CONCLUSION
It would be an understatement to suggest that the Court's approach to
the Seventh Amendment right in the context of non-Article III adjudication
lacks coherent or principled grounding in constitutional theory. On various
occasions, the Court has relied on wholly conclusory references to the pub-
lic rights doctrine, on flawed and misleading analyses of Seventh Amend-
ment interpretation, or on explicit reference to an "incompatibility" between
the jury trial right and a congressional scheme in the particular case.
Ultimately, the Court's exclusion of the jury trial right from most cases
of congressional transfer of adjudication to a non-Article III forum can be
rationalized only by means of a principle of functionalism. Under this prin-
ciple, the Court allows Congress to conclude that the needs of a particular
legislative scheme require adjudication without jury trial. The Court does
this, despite its assumption that absent such congressional action, the Sev-
enth Amendment would dictate the existence of the jury trial right. Judicial
revocation of an otherwise applicable constitutional right solely because of a
congressional judgment of incompatibility of that right with a legislative
scheme effectively inverts two fundamental precepts of American constitu-
tional theory. Those precepts are the supremacy 'of the Constitution over
conflicting congressional legislation and the power of the
countermajoritarian judiciary to sit as the final arbiter of the Constitution's
limits on the actions of the majoritarian branches.
Acceptance of this critique of the Court's Seventh Amendment jurispru-
dence would not necessarily lead to reversal of the Court's decisions up-
holding congressional abandonment of the jury trial right in non-Article III
proceedings. The Court could achieve much the same result by overruling
its decision in Parsons v. Bedford. This action would render the Seventh
Amendment inapplicable in any case in which the underlying substantive
2"9 See discussion supra notes 81-93 and accompanying text.
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cause of action was created after the amendment's adoption. If, however, the
Court were to choose not to overrule Parsons, under our critique it would
have to abandon most of its decisions upholding the exclusion of the jury
trial right in non-Article III proceedings where legal relief is sought. Our
process-based critique is agnostic on the issue of Parsons's current vitality.
Under governing principles of American constitutional theory, however, the
Court cannot have it both ways.
